


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West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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1 February 1985

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ARMS CONTROL

SPAIN

SPAIN BECOMES NATO LOGISTICAL PARTNER

Madrid YA in Spanish 2 Jan 85 p 9

[Text] Since yesterday, Spain has been a member of NATO's logistical organization, which was founded in 1958 to coordinate the weapons defense systems used in common, particularly the missiles and the electronic systems. Abandoning the military organizations in which Spain is already integrated would be a severe blow to our entire defense organization. The Socialist government is aware that it is impossible to be with the West and attempt to benefit from its advantages without also sharing its disadvantages.

The search for consensus on Spain's remaining in the Western defense strategy has appeared as the first political task for the new year. Yesterday, as the head of the government proposed in Congress, our country joined NATO's logistical organization, NAMS0, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, which was founded in 1958 to coordinate the commonly used weapons defense systems, particularly missiles and electronic systems.

This organization is the one which coordinates most of the spending done by the countries in the Alliance; because these are weapons systems used on a mass scale by the infantry and motorized cavalry; hence they must be produced in large amounts, attempting to make them interchangeable among the armies of the allied countries. The more sophisticated weapons, such as the frigates or the European combat plane, usually have specialized organizations, as do other logistical systems, such as the Air Alert one.

It would be difficult for Spain to leave any of those NATO military organizations in which it is already integrated, without affecting our entire defense budget programming, coordinated over the long term, for the purpose of modernizing our Armed Forces. Unfortunately, but realistically, it might be said that yesterday we took another step toward being left caught in the wheel of the arms increase required by membership in one of the blocs. This is in contradiction to President Gonzalez' idea that "Spain does not need to become part of the Alliance's integrated military structure."

NATO and EEC

To the pacifists, it may represent an unfortunate decision, but an inevitable one if we want to be "mature enough" to join EEC, without this meaning that

the two objectives could be interchanged. Each has distinct routes and rules; but the Socialist government has had sufficient evidence, during the past 2 years, and more clearcut evidence the more ideological identification there was with other European governments (those of France, Italy and Greece), that one cannot be with the West and attempt to benefit from its advantages without sharing its disadvantages.

The approval by Congress of the agreement with the United States whereby Spain pledges to maintain confidentiality regarding the technology of the weapons that it receives through the bilateral defense agreement is more proof that being with the West entails rules and obligations that must be kept. Moreover, sitting down at the Western decision-making table makes it possible to work more constructively, as was suggested in the proposal by Felipe Gonzalez, pressing for increasing disarmament and peace, than cutting oneself off in the utopia of neutrality, as subjects of the decisions of one or both blocs.

From that standpoint, the lack of interest among the parliamentary groups in the negotiations that the president of the government intends to resume after Epiphany to achieve maximum consensus on his famous decalogue, which is now unnecessary and impossible to fulfill, is not surprising. Because if President Gonzalez has attained what is most difficult, the backing of the congress of his party, correcting previous positions, he is now at liberty to remain in NATO, even without holding the referendum, concerning which there was not even any mention at the 30th Socialist Congress.

Consensus would be impossible, because the forces to the left of the ruling party would not back him on remaining in the Alliance, and those to the right of it have already expressed the desire to remain in the Alliance during the previous legislature. The referendum would mean spending money uselessly to reiterate something that the majority of the people's representatives already decided in 1982, and that now has a larger majority in Parliament; because of the 182 previous votes, there are now over 322 that would back this continuity in NATO. Holding the referendum under those conditions, besides that useless expenditure, would create a precedent that might bring into question the principle of representation in the major parliamentary decisions.

2909

CSO: 3548/70

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

GOALS, STRUCTURES OF TURKISH WORKERS SELF-HELP ORGANIZATIONS

Bonn DIE NEUE GESELLSCHAFT in German Oct 84, pp 982-987

[Article by; Gerhard Jahn and Faruk Sen: "Foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany and Their Political Integration Activities"]

[Excerpts] Self-Help Organizations Development Necessary

As early as the 1970's, all of the larger groups of foreigners had their own organizations within the FRG. With the passage of time, they began more and more to set political goals primarily related to their legal and political position in the FRG.

Moreover, they are more and more deeply concerned with the political developments in their respective homelands. It should be pointed out especially that the Turkish self-help organizations are very intensively concerned with the political developments in Turkey as well as the opportunities to improve the political status of foreigners in the FRG. One should note in particular the FIDEF (Federation of Progressive People's Units in the FRG) and the HDF (Federation of the Progressive People' Units in Europe).

Turkish Self-Help Organizations

The Turkish associations in the FRG take divergent stances regarding the political developments in Turkey and the issue of integration of Turks in the FRG.

The largest Turkish organization in the FRG is the affiliate of the nationalistic-Fascist party MHP, "National Movement Party," in Turkey. This Fascist-oriented organization has 111 regional branches with approximately 26,000 members within the FRG. The "Turkish Democratic Associations of Idealists" with headquarters in Frankfurt have a pan-Turkish, Fascist orientation. They support repatriation and reject integration of the Turks in the FRG.

The "Islamic Cultural Centers" and the "Islamic Union" are just as strongly politically oriented to the right and oppose integration. The Islamic

Cultural Center with its headquarters in Cologne has 210 local branches and about 18,000 members. They are adherents of the Sueleymanci movement which has been banned in Turkey and whose founders fought against the reform policies of Ataturk in the 1920's and 1930's in Turkey. The Sueleymanci movement, which has founded the Koran schools that have been banned in Turkey throughout the FRG, promotes an anti-German policy restrictive to integration.

The "Islamic Union" represents the goals of the National Welfare Party [Nationale Heilspartei]. This pro-Islamic oriented organization rejects the Western orientation of Turkey and strives towards a re-Islamization. Their dismissive attitude towards integration of Turks in the FRG is considered to be based on the differences between Islamism and Christianity. Trends towards modernization and efforts towards integration under the present Turkish resident population is considered treasonous to Islam. The size of these organizations can only be estimated. According to estimates, these organizations have up to 100 branches with about 20,000 members. However, these figures are not reliable.

"Hur-Turk" represents the smallest group within the rightist self help organizations that were founded with the support of the CDU and the Conrad Adenauer Foundation. This conservative, recent founding by local dignitaries primarily represents the interests of the conservative Turkish Justice Party in the FRG. CDU politicians and Turkish businessmen in the FRG are represented on the board of directors of this organization which occupies the center right. However, these members are said to have connections with the Islamic Cultural Centers.

The organized Turkish left in the FRG is numerous and noncohesive. It ranges from extreme leftist organizations to organizations that feel committed to democratic socialism.

As self-help organizations promoting policies of integration in the interests of the Turkish resident population, three umbrella organizations are significant. The largest and oldest of these is the FIDEF, (the Federation of Turkish Labor Unions in the FRG). According to various German institutions, it has orthodox communist orientation. It is reported to have 10,000 to 15,000 members. In accordance with its claim, the FIDEF primarily opposes Right extremists, especially its own countrymen, in the FRG. Other key points are activities counter hostility to foreigners and the promotion of a liberal policy regarding foreigners.

The second largest leftist self-help organization is the HDF. This organization, oriented towards social democratic principles, was founded in Berlin in 1977 and has, at this time, 32 local branches with 10,000 members throughout the FRG. The HDF aligns itself with Social Democrats even more distinctly than the CHP, the Republican People's Party in Turkey with which it corresponds.

In the FRG, the HDF works closely with the SPD and the social security organization. It is probably the most recognized Turkish self-help

organization by German institutions. Ever since 1980, it has dealt intensively with the policies regarding foreigners in the FRG. The HDF, as representatives of the interests of the Turkish resident population, sensitizes the German public to the problems encountered by the Turks in the FRG by holding various professional meetings and seminars. Since 1982 the HDF has substantially increased its work in the public sector and its continuing education programs for Germans and Turks through the cooperation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and with financial assistance from the Krupp Foundation. Member associations of the HDF are also found in other Western states, such as the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden. Following the 1980 military putsch, a political key point of their work has been the reestablishment of democracy in Turkey. Their press organs are a journal in Turkish and the journal "HDF-meint" [HDF views] in German which appears quarterly.

The DIDEF (Federation of Democratic Laborers Associations) is the third leftist oriented Turkish organization. Their activities are primarily directed against hostility to foreigners here in FRG. The DIDEF has been in its formative stage until recently. In the meantime however, it has already established associations in a few German cities.

All three of the organizations mentioned above seek contact with German institutions.

Cooperation With Other Organizations

Following the foreign organizations' formative stages which have been in progress since the mid 1970's, cooperation between self-help organizations and German institutions has increased. However, optimal cooperation has not yet been achieved.

In numerous cities, the two churches (Catholic and Protestant) cooperate with Turkish self-help organizations and defend the concerns of the Islamic guest workers in the FRG.

As representatives of the interests of the guest workers in the FRG, the DGB remains in contact with various foreign organizations. In connection with this, it should be mentioned that there are representatives of all the important participating states in the guest worker program in the "Guest Workers" division of the DGB's board of directors. On a regional level, the DGB works with local foreign unions within the framework of a legal counsel of guest workers.

Under the Turkish federations, the DGB accepts the HDF as a participatory partner. Due to the political attitude of the FIDEF, no dialogue has occurred yet between the FIDEF and the DGB. The DGB rejects organizations such as the Islamic Cultural Centers that it characterizes as foreign institutions which inhibit integration.

In the case of welfare organizations, continuous cooperation between the social security organization and the HDF can be seen in various cities.

The social security organizations look after the Turkish, Yugoslavian, and Moroccan guest workers in the FRG. The pro-foreigner attitude of the social security organization supports the demand for the foreigners' right to vote in local elections also motivates the self-help organizations to cooperate intensively with the social security organization. Like the DGB, the social security organization likewise refused to cooperate with Turkish Islamic and Fascist self-help organizations. The social security organization also does not cooperate with other extremist oriented organizations.

The SPD and especially its youth organization, the Young Socialists, cooperate with Turkish, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian socialist self-help organizations. These contacts have been considerably increased in the recent past on the federal level as well as on the Land level. To sensitize the German public to the problems facing foreigners, the Young Socialists stage events concerning policies affecting foreigners in cooperation with the above mentioned organizations.

Right to Vote

The political participation of foreigners in the FRG is occurring, as has already been mentioned, in many cities through what is known as the foreigners advisory boards. The foreigners advisory boards which report to the city council of each respective city have an advisory nature and are usually incorporated in the social welfare office.

The members of the advisory boards are primarily appointed and are usually German and foreign members from various countries with both parties having equal voting strength. In some cities like Gelsenkirchen, Ulm and Aachen, the foreign members are elected directly through the primary election.

In their political powerlessness, the foreign resident population has not been satisfied with the current work of the foreigners advisory boards. At present, there are certainly efforts being made in the Ruhr area to improve the rank of the foreigners advisory boards and to improve their structure, but even these efforts, such as the foreigners advisory boards in Essen, cannot, in the long run, fulfill the goal of the true political participation of foreigners.

An integration of "politically underage citizens" is difficult to visualize. If the integration efforts for the foreigners living here were seriously meant by the Germans, then the Federal Government and the German parties would need to go a step further and enable the political integration of foreigners through the right to vote in local elections in the future.

Only the Green Party at present has raised the issue of promoting the foreigners' right to vote in local elections. Besides the Young Socialists who have voiced their support within the SPD for the granting of the right to vote in local elections, the SPD itself seems to find its dismissive attitude regarding the right to vote in local elections as a means towards political integration loosening up, at the very least, the initiatives of

the Bundestag parliamentary group (Herta Daeubler-Gmelin) point in this direction. In any case, we must wait and see how far the party as a whole opens itself up to this problem.

The self help organizations work heavily with many German institutions, associations and unions in regards to the realization of the right to vote in local elections. Thus they wished to make this demand capable of carrying a majority vote within the total population. The most important public work is conducted by the "People's Initiative for Equality of Rights and Integration" (IGI) in Berlin. The IGI was founded in Berlin by work immigrants from Turkey. It consists of workers, shop councils, unions, teachers, journalists and scientists. This association demands a new legal status for the foreign resident population which they characterize as right of settlement. This includes an unrestricted right to work and residence, the right to vote in local elections, and the right to free choice of employment. These demands are supported by numerous foreign organizations in Berlin and the FRG.

In regards to the Turks, the Turkish daily newspaper "Hurriyet" ascertained shortly before the Bundestag election in 1983 that the foreign population actually wanted to be granted the right to vote in local elections. The survey was conducted two weeks before the Bundestag elections and was met with great interest on the part of the Turks in the FRG. The respondents numbered 14,551. According to the results of the survey, the Turks would vote as follows, if they were granted the right to vote in local elections:

Party	Votes	%
SPD	9197	63.2
CDU	4026	27.7
Greens	571	3.9
FDP	483	3.3
Other	274	1.9

Source: ITZ, Nr. 2, April 1983, p 26

Another survey conducted among Turkish youth in February/March 1983 in Duisberg yielded the following results: 66 percent would vote for the SPD; 12 percent, the CDU/CSU; 4 percent, the FDP; and 16 percent, the Green/Alternative parties.

Since the FRG has become politically an immigration country for many foreigners, the self-help organizations will have to work in closer cooperation with German institutions so as to improve the realization of their demands. On the other hand, German parties and political institutions should take the political demands of the democratic self-help organizations seriously, since it is through these organizations that the needs and political concerns of the foreign resident population are realistically reflected.

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SENIOR LABOR MINISTRY OFFICIAL CLARIFIES GUEST WORKER POLICY

Dusseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 6 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Hanshort Viehof, ministerial director in the Federal Ministry of Labor; director for labor market policy, unemployment insurance, guest worker policy: "Integration Promoted Through Clear Legal Structure"]

[Text] Bonn. Everyone knows that there is a difference between prejudices and sound judgments. The best way to examine prejudices and to arrive at opinions grounded in facts is to look at the facts. Prejudices are daily fare when dealing with policies regarding guest workers. Bar stools are not always the seats of reason. Just the opposite, the reactions to prejudices often lead to polarization. Reality and involvement are necessary, especially with those issues that concern our coexistence with fellow foreign citizens.

We need principles in policies concerning guest workers. Principles are necessary to clarify the means and goals to the Germans and the guest workers. The Federal Government has established the following principles for its policies regarding guest workers:

- the integration of those guest workers and their families who have been our neighbors for some time now,
- restriction of an additional influx of guest workers
- assistance in repatriation to their home countries on a strictly voluntary basis.

Psychological Barriers Disturb Coexistence

Integration means the greatest possible, unrestricted participation of the guest workers in their professional and social life in the Federal Republic of Germany. The extent of this task--more than half of the guest workers have already lived among us for ten or more years, and almost two-thirds of the guest workers' children under 16 years of age were born in Germany.

Integration can only succeed when psychological barriers between guest workers and Germans can be overcome. One such barrier was the sharp increase in the foreign population especially between 1977 and 1982. At that time, 719,000 additional foreigners entered the Federal Republic of Germany through birth and immigration.

This stymied the success of the integration efforts (which was hard to gather in the public discussions widespread at the time) and created problems in employment even for the guest workers themselves. At the same time, hostility towards the guest workers increased and the German population's insight to the necessity of guest worker integration decreased. Bearing this in mind, the decrease in the total number of foreigners by 303,000 to the current figure of 4.36 million since autumn 1982 was factually and politically helpful.

Integration requires appropriate basic legal provisions. Therefore, the right of residence should be standardized in the near future and improved by a new Alien Law. Complaints about an alleged uncertain right of residence for the foreigners certainly do not withstand critical examination in many cases. Already 57.2 percent of those foreigners over 16 years of age, and therefore requiring an alien residence permit, have solid residence status either through a title of residence because they are citizens of European Community member states or through an unrestricted residence permit or title of residence because they are members of other states.

Amendment Should Authorities' Discretion

The aim of amending the Alien Law is also to limit the authorities discretion and to make the right of residence for those foreigners living here more obvious and more secure by standard legal regulation through the formulation of legal claims.

The integration in the right to a work permit has seen even more progress. Already at the end of last year, almost 89 percent of the foreigners were exempt from a work permit because they were either citizens of European Community states or, as citizens of other states, they possessed a special work permit. That means that these guest workers do not need to take a back seat to their German colleagues in the labor market.

They are under no restrictions in regards to employment in industrial, or professional areas, or in type of job or location. Unemployed foreigners with firm labor market status can basically receive the same unemployment assistance as the Germans and there is no time limitation. All guest workers have the same rights in the areas of work and social law as their German colleagues, even in drawing unemployment benefits.

Opportunities have improved for family members entering the job market. Since 1980, large groups of foreign youth (youth with well-rounded German education or training, graduates of a 10 month career oriented courses, as well as trainees) already have a legal claim to entering the labor market and receiving a special work permit without a waiting period. In the

meantime, over 200,000 family members of guest workers have received a work permit for the first time.

No Barrier Through Work Permit

The right to a work permit is neither misused as a barrier to the labor market, a presumption that is sometimes heard, or even as an instrument for discipline. Figures exemplify the by and large liberal management of this right. In 1983 and until September 1984, 972,000 applications for work permits were received which included first-time applications, renewal of applications, and applications for continuous work. Only 64,000 applications were turned down after careful examination. That is a rejection rate of only $6\frac{1}{2}$ percent, a fact that should refute the preconceptions when viewed in terms of the unemployment of 2 million German workers!

On the other hand, it would be false to lightly dismiss the high unemployment rate among foreigners. On the average in 1983, 14.7 percent of the guest workers were unemployed. In November 1984, the figure still stood at 12.9 percent. This figure clearly exceeds the 1983 yearly average unemployment rate of 9.1 percent for the total population and the November 1984 rate of 8.8 percent.

Labor Risk Equally High

One receives a true picture only through close examination. On the average in 1983, 12.5 percent of the German workers were also unemployed. In November 1984, unemployment was still as high as 11.7 percent. The comparison of the unemployment rate of workers is more telling since it documents that the higher risk of unemployment for the guest worker is based not on nationality but in fact on type of employment. They are predominately employed as unskilled or semiskilled workers in branches of the economy that are especially dependent on the business cycle. The unemployment rate for unskilled workers (1983:17.4 percent) exceeded by far even that of the guest workers.

No Career Training

Integration is even more successful, the younger the person is and the earlier the person learns to work with others. Here we can clearly see progress. The share of foreign children who have graduated from the upper division of German elementary school approaches 60 percent. The number of foreign children in continuing education schools is steadily climbing. In spite of the wellknown bottlenecks in teaching positions, the number of foreigners needing training alone could climb by 5,000 to 44,000 between June 1982 and June 1983.

At the same time the professional situation of many young foreigners is unsatisfactory. More than half of the young foreigners neither finished career training nor continuing education schooling. Deficiencies appear especially with those youth who come to live with their parents without having a command of German, and without having achieved a good education in their home country.

Success in Promoting Repatriation

Both on the federal and Land level attempts have been made to subsequently balance out linguistic and training deficiencies. At present, about 75,000 predominately young foreigners are being trained linguistically and professionally through federal assistance. Of this number, 20,000 young foreigners are participating in programs to prepare candidates for jobs and social integration and are participating in the general job preparation and job training classes of the Federal Employment Office. Finally, more than 30,000 foreign youth will have attended language classes this year.

The task of integration can only be solved when the influx of workers from other countries is consistently restricted from this point on. We will adhere to the unrestricted cessation of recruitment. Sufficiently long transition periods are absolutely necessary for the establishment of the freedom of movement with member countries of the European Community. Within the framework of the association agreement between the European Community and Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany will do its utmost to prevent unlimited access to the labor market. Illegal practices in the entry, residence, and employment of guest workers will continue to be fought and with increased vigor.

Not all foreigners who live among us also want to remain here. Facilitating repatriation to their home country is a necessary additional key point, besides integration, to the policies concerning foreigners. With the Repatriation Assistance Law, the key note was the strictly voluntary basis. The Federal Government has always spoken out against a forced reintegration in whatever manner. It will also adhere to strictly voluntary basis in the future.

The Repatriation Assistance Law was oriented towards this principle. It was a success. About 125,000 foreign workers have applied for the immediate restitution of their contributions to the social security pension fund; almost 17,000, for direct repatriation assistance. Including the family members, about 300,000 foreigners are said to have decided to return to their homelands with the help of the Repatriation Assistance Law. Bearing in mind the labor markets of the countries of origin, the above mentioned assistance should remain on a one-time only basis.

Liberal, Humane Policies Continued

However there are important legal measures which remain in existence with the repatriation and reintegration consultation. They fit perfectly into the long term plan of the Federal Republic of Germany. Even with the implementation of its developmental measures, the Federal Republic of Germany will make every effort in the future to see that gainful employment possibilities for foreigners are created or improved for those workers who return to their home countries from the Federal Republic of Germany.

The policies concerning foreigners must span the gap between Germans and foreigners, and between our republic and the countries of origin. The Federal

Government will stand firm by its humane and liberal policies concerning foreigners in spite of economic difficulties. It will put into place additional supports to span the gap. Whether the bridges are extended depends on each individual--at work, in groups and associations, in interactions with our neighbors who therefore must not be excluded. What we need is involvement and realism.

12348

CSO: 3620/188

POLITICAL

GREECE

BUDGET APPROVAL POINTS TO CHANGED POLITICAL RULES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23-24 Dec 84 pp 1,14

[Article by Nikos Nikolaou: "PASOK Leadership Tremendous Economic Force"]

[Text] After the "famous" 5-year [plan] the government also passed the draft budget in parliament without any great losses and thus, as it looks to the October 1985 elections, it now has not only plenty of time but also a greater freedom of movement to impose the party government more skillfully as well as more efficiently. The opportunity to dispose of public funds without any control, the opacity surrounding the management of failing enterprises by party luminaries, the gigantic expansion of new state monopolies of the Promet type (which imports at this point goods from lentils to gasoline engines!) and, above all, the famous intergovernmental agreements with countries of the East and of the Third World gather into the hands of the PASOK's group of leaders a tremendous economic force whose orientation and ultimate results are obvious, in view of the upcoming prelection period.

The four-day battle in parliament about the budget proved that the official opposition was unable once again to put some sort of restraint on the government's highhandedness, while according to the evaluation of economic observers the way the government's attack was dealt with this year was the feeblest in the past three years. This weakness is ascribed first to the internal difficulties existing within the official opposition which prevent it from achieving a clearcut ideology and party line, and second to the fact that there is a different kind of government for the first time in our country, which, having forsaken the classical rules of the democratic game, governs the nation through centralizing mechanisms that remain outside any kind of popular control.

The opposition does not appear to have become aware of the deep changes which have taken place in our democratic political system and insists on carrying on the fight at a level at which the government not only fails even to respond to it but also systematically spurns it, so that it has ceased to be a front for political dialogue and ideological confrontation.

This spurning of parliament was the first sad discovery made by the economic observers who followed the fourday discussions and noted with regret that Mr. K. Mitsotakis, as the leader of the ND, was just as unable as his predecessor to bring the Premier to parliament and force him into a

dialogue for which the entire nation waited anxiously, so that some answers could be given to crucial questions regarding the nation's course.

Intentional Spurning

All those who were in Parliament after midnight on Thursday as the debate came to an end literally felt grief as they watched the premier come out of the political bureau escorted by a following of deputies and advisers and enter the room with an arrogant air only to cast his vote! Mr. Andreas Papandreou, who can speak for 4 hours and read aloud 300 pages at a meeting of party members and who makes endless speeches before his followers at every opportunity, bringing to mind meetings of the Supreme Soviet where there is one prolific speaker for hundreds of silent applauding listeners, had been unable to find the 10 or 20 minutes' time to follow the debate on the budget in parliament which happens to be the climax of the parliamentary political system. This frightful disdain for rules and institutions is not coincidental, of course, and those who ascribe it to the psychological problems and phobias from which the premier allegedly suffers with regard to the leader of the opposition are making a grave mistake. The matter goes deeper and the spurning is intentional.

Systematic Undermining of Institutions

The PASOK is systematically attempting to weaken all the institutions related to dialogue and popular participation and that is why it systematically transfers all the centers of power to other mechanisms such as the party, the anti-right committees which are being created, nationalized enterprises, prefectural councils, government monopolies, branch committees etc.

While this systematic transfer of the centers of power which takes place in a climate of political polarization and harsh party antagonism fanaticizes large popular masses and gathers around the PASOK stubborn followers, it is not by chance that Mr. Papandreou, in his latest appearance before party members, used the term "counterrevolution" in connection with the ND (as if those who had lived on US charity for years had made some kind of revolution in Greece!). This slogan, which if it catches on among the people will lead to incredible rifts, is not only intended to lure the votes of the traditional left in the next elections but its ultimate aim is to emphasize the fact that from now on a new form of power is getting established which, in order to prevent the return of the ...counterrevolution can do what it pleases to the army, to justice, to the economy etc. Saving the revolution is the supreme law!

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PASOK REPORTEDLY ENVISIONS POST-ELECTORAL COOPERATION WITH KKE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 30-31 Dec 84 pp 1-2

[Article by Nikos Nikolaou]

[Text] At this time vexation about the immediate tactics and dissatisfaction as to Mr. Andreas Papandreou's eventual choices prevail among leading deputies and other responsible elements, as government work increasingly comes into conflict with obstacles and delays related to the PASOK's top leaders' post election plans and aims.

According to information from reliable economic circles, leading deputies and other qualified elements who lately had the "privilege" of conferring with Mr. Andreas Papandreou and sharing his worries about the pending elections and the possible shape the popular verdict will take came away with the firm belief that the premier:

First, is now convinced that an autonomous PASOK government cannot be achieved by any kind of electoral system that will be adopted for the October confrontation. "Any kind" meaning, of course, that the system to be implemented will be improved relative to the system which had been in effect since 1974, and will be closer to the basic principles of simple proportionality. Such a system entails that the third and maybe fourth party can count on at least 10 seats more than those it could have obtained under today's electoral system of reinforced proportionality.

An attempt to alter the system for the worse so that it will favor the first party is out of the question. Mr. Papandreou has been warned from higher up not to attempt such a coup and this message, of course, laid to rest Mr. Koutsoyorgas' greed.

Second, he is beginning to get used a little more every day to the idea of a bipartisan government after the elections, which he categorically limits to the wider forces of the Left, which in practice only means, in fact, a PASOK and KKE government. And this because it is certain that the first condition the Communist Party will set for cooperation will be the exclusion from the "front of the Change" of the heretics who question both their orthodoxy and their exclusive right to represent [the people].

The same deputies and qualified officials also have the feeling that the leader of the PASOK is already elaborating a program of minimum government cooperation between the two parties, with the chief aim of gradually eliminating from the mechanisms of the state all the props "of the cold war-waging and revanchist Right", as he calls it himself, and particularly minimizing any possible objections from the so-called foreign factor, that is, the Americans. Mr. Papandreou's always daring imagination is already captivated by the vision that he might be the first premier in Europe who will manage to become the leader of a front of marxist forces, which will irrevocably "yugoslavize" the economy, which will not only rely on the friendship of the Soviet Union and the money of the capitalistic EEC but will also be simultaneously protected by the U.S. defensive umbrella.

Possible Surprises

Of course these orientations and Mr. A. Papandreou's post election schemes are, first, far from definite since all surprises are possible in every electoral confrontation and, second, because not only they are not publicized but whenever they are discussed they are met by his own angry denials. Something of the sort is quite natural. No leader of a big party heading for a decisive confrontation admits a priori that he has lost the autonomy game and furthermore a disclosure as of now of Mr. Papandreou's schemes would sow in the PASOK a wind of defeatism which would decimate its popular following, while repelling en masse centrist elements who under no circumstance would agree to the overthrow of the free economy system.

However, despite the fact that at this point Mr. Papandreou's orientations have the character of a prospect rather than that of immediate practise (whereas it is certain that in the elections his whole tactics will rely on exposing the dangers of a return of a vengeful Right with a view to pilfering in favor of the PASOK the votes of the KKE), as referred to at the beginning, a climate is being already created within the government and above all, the activities of some deputies are being curtailed.

The forces leaning to the center in the government and within the PASOK, to the extent that they are able to discuss the subject with Mr. Papandreou, are in favor of examining alternative solutions for plans for cooperation between parties after the elections. But the premier categorically rejects any form of governmental cooperation with the New Democracy or any section of it, invoking:

-First, his deep personal antagonism with Mr. K. Mitsotakis which he puts forward as a taboo.

-Second, his conviction that the Right can never be split, so that the possibility that "apostates" could be found in its ranks who would be ready to cooperate with him is excluded.

-Third, the acutely fanatical mentality of the PASOK's popular base which would more or less interpret as treason any kind of cooperation with the "Right".

-Fourth, the transformation of the KKE into a big party since, in essence, it would be left to play the role of the opposition.

According to information from economic circles, prospects that centrist officials will be able to change Mr. A. Papandreou's orientations are rather unlikely, because of the authoritarian character of the party's leadership but also because the PASOK's own Center Left, for its own traditional reasons, does not wish to cooperate with Mr. K. Mitsotakis.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PASOK TACTICS REPORTEDLY FOCUSING ON RURAL AREAS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 6-7 Jan 85 pp 1, 15

[Article by Stamos Zoulas: "PASOK to Give Election Fight Class Dimensions"]

[Text] The PASOK, in putting to the best use all its advantages as a party and exploiting the New Democracy's fundamental weaknesses, has chosen the provinces as the main battlefield of the upcoming electoral confrontation. This can be deduced from a number of factors and indications as the party in power elaborates its election tactics. All the planning is clearly oriented toward reshuffling the political forces and new tendencies which have emerged in the electoral body in the course of the 32 months which have elapsed between the deputies' election in October 1981 and the Euro-elections of June 1984. And the new tactics' aim is to limit the PASOK's losses of votes in the rural areas and to make up for them through making converts or "mobilizing" new followers among the rural or suburban population. The ND has already ascertained its opponent's change of tactics and is working on how to counter it.

This scheme's ultimate aim is to preserve autonomy with the help also of the new election law which, without going to provocative lengths, however, has been made "concordant" with the PASOK's new tactics.

As is known, during the 32 months which elapsed between the deputies' elections of 1981 and the Euro-elections of last June, Mr. Papandreou's party lost 6.5 proportional units.

The imbalance in this loss between urban, suburban and rural areas constitutes the chief factor dictating the change in the party's election tactics.

New Distribution

In urban centers the PASOK's losses amounted to about 9 proportional units (which fell from 48.19% in 1981 to 39.4% in the Euro-elections). Whereas in the rural areas the PASOK's share in the Euro-election remained at 43.8%, that is 2.2 proportional units over its general percentage (of 41.6%), while in the suburban areas it remained at 41.2%.

These sharp differences in the voting body constituted for many analysts of our socio-political scene the most significant factor which emerged from the Euro-elections. The most fundamental and credible explanation for this differentiation in vote results between urban and rural populations is related of course to the economic crisis and the resulting problems (inflation, unemployment, worsening of the quality of life, etc.) which affect chiefly the 5 or 6 million inhabitants of urban centers; the 1.1 million inhabitants of suburban centers and the 3 millions of our rural population (according to the 1981 census) who were not faced with the same pressures from these problems were still able to satisfactorily maintain or even improve their standard of living during the past 3 years.

EEC Contributions

It is enough to note that EEC contributions channelled to our rural population reached the following peaks: 9 billion drachmas in 1981; 45 billion drachmas in 1982; 57 billion drachmas in 1983; 89 billion drachmas in 1984, which are expected to reach 100 billion drachmas in 1985.

Under the circumstances and in conjunction with a small increase in production, rural income showed a steady increase. (Production growth for 1984 was around 12%).

And yet this year too the "Change" viewed farmers as "underprivileged" and granted them...additional privileges. The limit of non-taxable rural income was raised from 1.25 million drachmas to 1.6 million drachmas while OGA [Farm Insurance Organization] pensions were being raised simultaneously.

The PASOK government is aware, of course, of all the factors and elements which contribute to the difference between the votes of the city dweller and the peasant. But it knows equally well that the political weight of those two classes is inversely proportional to its numeral strength. Indeed, although the urban population is double the rural one it has less influence on the elections' outcome. And this because the composition of the political forces seldom presents significant or determining variations in urban centers where, as a rule, the voter is more stable and more mature in his political beliefs. (The differences which emerged in the 1981 elections proved to be the exception which confirms the rule, since the distribution of forces was restored with the Euro-elections).

More Vulnerable

Whereas the rural world is more vulnerable to being influenced and swayed, especially if those [influences] stem from the source of power.

The PASOK is determined to exploit this phenomenon to the fullest. Its party mechanisms have already begun to give a class significance to the difference in the voting preferences of the urban and rural populations.

The electoral victories or defeats of the governing party in the elections

of various professional or scientific fields (lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc.), far from being unpublicized by the PASOK's propagandists in the provinces, are held up as a concrete proof of the "struggle" the "Change" is carrying on against the "privileged professions" and for "a fairer distribution of the revenue and its transfer from the center to the periphery"...

The multiplicity of small and as a rule unproductive projects which are being carried out or planned in the provinces have the same political aim. Those works contribute to absorbing a significant number of unemployed, selected of course among the local PASOK organizations, while the exploitation of those works by the party is viewed as more direct and more efficient.

The "Anti-Right Citizens"

The creation of "Anti-Right citizens' committees" is viewed as the height of the PASOK's election tactics' "inspirations" and "innovations." In establishing those committees the governing party has two ends in view:

- a) to create a preliminary "political arena" for an indirect contest between the ND and the PASOK so as to proselytize potential followers;
- b) to facilitate the adhesion of leftist voters. Essentially, as the government intends, those committees will constitute the indispensable pretext for converting the voters who are inclined to leave their party either because they offer less resistance to the PASOK's party mechanisms' coercive methods or because they are more vulnerable to the temptation of participating in the exercise of power.

A few days ago a member of the PASOK described to a group of fellow ideologists the way to "attract" a rural voter of the ND who submits some petition to the government: for instance for an agricultural loan. The imaginary dialogue takes place between the petitioning farmer and a local PASOK functionary:

FUNCTIONARY: We know that you are not one of our followers and that you voted for the ND. But we will grant you the loan because you are not a fascist. Or are you?

FARMER: No, I am not a fascist.

FUNCTIONARY: Then you will enroll in the committee of anti-Rightist citizens.

ND Weakness

Naturally, there are many who doubt the brilliance of the PASOK's inspirations and the efficiency of its methods. But the philosophy of the governing party's new tactics, as could be seen from the beginning, does not rely only on the capacity of the PASOK's party mechanisms to implement them but also on the weakness of the reaction which has been noted, so far at least, within the ND.

One of the most serious consequences for the official opposition, resulting from the discarding of the X to indicate a choice, is the gradual decrease of the New Democracy's contacts with the populations of small villages and settlements. Up to now the ND has been able to compete with the impeccable party organization, the coordination and the abundance of material means available to its opponents, thanks only to the zeal, the interest, the political emulation of its deputies and politicians who waged a daily battle in their workplace or in the coffeehouse of the farthest mountain village, touring their electoral district.

Now the ND's presence as a party, its contacts and dialogue have vanished from a significant portion of the nation and of the voting body. Suffice it to say that most of the former ministers have more or less set it down as a condition not to be sent to speak in towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants, while many deputies who view their inclusion on the slate as an...obligation of their faction prefer to "fight" from their political headquarters in the capital or in the large cities of their district.

The ND is favored by the fact that the motives and eventual consequences of the unequal political struggle which is taking place in the provinces to this day have been perceived. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the party of the official opposition, as was proven by the latest activities of its followers, in relation to its opponents does not lack in either enthusiasm, dynamism, or the wish to participate. In fact the PASOK's three years in power tend to reverse the factors shaping each time the morale and degree of aggressiveness of the parties' voting base.

Thus, what the ND is missing at present are tactics adapted to today's political conditions, organization, coordination and inspirational guidance of its party potential.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

NEW DEMOCRACY URGED TO ADOPT PROPER MEASURES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in GREEK 1 Jan 85 p 7

[Editorial: "As We Enter Crucial 1985"]

[Text] All the predictions and warnings are far more than signs that 1985, which begins today, will be a particularly crucial twelve months for Greece.

With regard to everything that will take place at home as well as to what could happen, with regard to it, outside its borders. And beyond all the foregoing, the predictable and the unpredictable, are the two elections at home, presidential and parliamentary, and outside the borders developments in the Cyprus issue.

Without any inclination to dramatize, which would be superfluous at any rate, we can say that the outcome of those three issues: the presidential election, the parliamentary election and the Cyprus question, and perhaps of one of those three, could seal our nation's course for many decades, that is forever...

Unfortunately, even when evaluated with the best disposition, the government does not leave much room for hope or optimism. For 38 months (out of the projected 48 months) in power it has been unable to present a concrete and complete program in any sector. Neither was it able to learn even a minimum about the skill of governing. Thus improvisation has replaced planning, focusing on the party is an attempt to make up for the failure in the exercise of power and populism tries to cover up the void created by the denial of hopes.

Neither does the government itself doubt its own failure, because otherwise it would show some restraint. But the government's extensive and obvious failure creates proportional responsibilities for the official opposition. Not only with regard to taking over power, which is a routine matter in a democracy, but in turning itself into a source of hope, after the PASOK's failings, to shelter those whose hopes have been denied and inspire those who were disappointed by the PASOK phenomenon.

There are no ideological barriers to prevent the New Democracy from playing this role. On the contrary, in contrast to the PASOK'S negative

haziness, the party of the official opposition has an ideological identity and breadth, so much so that it can, in fact, gather to itself ideologically a large number of the people who joined the PASOK in the belief that it could offer a better democracy to the nation, more social and economic justice, less partisanship, a more modern conception of the exercise of power, better education, more scientific economic planning, healthier trade unionism, a higher level of political life, another quality of society and power. The New Democracy is now invited to offer all these things to the people who are asking for them. And it has every possibility of offering them, not just promising them. But something more is also needed: it has to inspire the certainty that it will offer them, that it can offer them. And it has every possibility for that.

First of all, a long tradition, a deep social response and a wide ideological framework, a leader with undoubted potential, recently and triumphantly elected through the most democratic processes, valuable candidates for leadership and an experienced political machinery. If all the above are put to proper use, if everyone and everything functions rightly and in unison, if this becomes apparent in everyday political practice, it will suffice to inspire in the people the feeling of confidence stemming from unshakable unity and the conviction of winning the elections without which none of those who left it in 1981 will come back to it.

With its longtime experience the New Democracy should not be unaware of the fact that disappointment with one party does not necessarily lead one to another party unless that other one inspires confidence. And with the sharp political acumen it ought to have it should not be unaware, either, that the upcoming elections will not only be significant for the party which will win but also decisive for the party that will lose...

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POLITICAL

GREECE

AVAILABLE CHOICES FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5 Jan 85 pp 1,3

[Text] Choosing an electoral system as time begins to run short for submitting it is proving to be a particularly "delicate" issue for the government. When it comes to practice, its preelection commitment to establish "a system of simple proportionality" is diverging from the system of simple proportionality and getting closer to the fundamental principles of reinforced proportionality. This change in the government was confirmed during the party's December conference, when the premier, Mr. Andreas Papandreou announced that the electoral system the PASOK will submit will: a) ensure an autonomous, strong government, and b) make possible a representation of all the tendencies but without their becoming minorities that could alter situations.

The system that could best serve this dual and contradictory aim is the system of reinforced proportionality as it is implemented today. Because this system does not put any restriction whatever on obtaining a seat, except, of course, that of the electoral count by district.

But without changing it the PASOK cannot submit the current reinforced proportionality system as a "system of simple proportionality." So if the reinforced system is selected the new electoral law will have to foresee modifications. And just about the only modification that can be made in the reinforced [system] is a lowering of the parties' participation limit in 2nd and 3rd allocations (and in the allocation of deputies of the state. Today this limit is 17% of the totality of valid ballots in the entire nation.

It is obvious that a slight decrease in the limit (from 17% to 15%) would evoke protests from the KKE and the parties outside of parliament. On the other hand, a more important decrease (of 12% or 10%) would satisfy only the KKE but upset all the other small parties. And it would also defeat the government's principle of autonomy since the KKE's very probable access to 2nd and 3rd allocations would deprive the first party of the possibility to form an autonomous government.

Thus, the outwardly most logical modification of the reinforced [system], to the participation limit to 2nd and 3rd allocations will probably have to be excluded.

But there is a margin for other modifications, such as:

- A participation of all parties in the allocation of state deputy seats whose number will be simultaneously raised from 12 to 15 (which is the highest limit foreseen by the Constitution).

- The expansion of electoral districts either by establishing the statutory district (versus that of the province which is valid at present) or by merging small adjacent districts.

- Granting the right to participate in a second allocation not to the entire nation but to major electoral districts. A provision to that effect in the electoral law in force in 1963 and 1964 had been implemented. At the time, beyond the general limit, which was 15% of the valid ballots for the nation, the possibility of participating in a second allocation for major electoral districts was foreseen, provided the party either had at least one deputy elected in the first allocation or one of the electoral districts qualifying as a major one or collected 10% of the valid ballots of that while major district.

Modifications on those precise points of the electoral law could be made without upsetting the government's fundamental aims with regard to the electoral system, since the nation's second largest party happens to approve them also.

The other possible system the government might submit is the D'Hondt system. This system's chief characteristic is that all the seats of each electoral district are allocated to only one category.

According to this system, seats are allocated by successively dividing the totality of each party's votes by 1,2,3,4, etc. until the available number of seats per district is exhausted. The seats are allocated to the parties which after each division show the highest remainder.

As is natural, in small and medium electoral districts the D'Hondt system works just like the system of reinforced proportionality. Only in the larger districts does the system achieve a more proportional allocation of seats. And that because it is only in such districts that the balance of forces between the parties (which exist today in Greece) makes it possible to win a seat (provided, of course, those parties get the proportion of votes which would have entitled them to a seat in both electoral systems of reinforced or simple proportionality).

The D'Hondt system, by not allowing a second and third allocation, not even, in fact, on the basis of the so-called "unused remainders," does not give seats to the small parties as is the case with simple proportionality.

Precisely for that reason the small parties will not sanction the D'Hondt system, despite the fact that this system too, like that of reinforced proportionality, does not deny to any party the seats it should have won

on the basis of its real political power in each electoral district.

Simple Proportionality

The KKE and the parties outside of parliament are asking for simple proportionality. But even if the government should select simple proportionality, it cannot but make important changes to it in order to preserve the principle of governmental stability (autonomy) supported by the two largest parties which, put together, represent 80% of the Greek people.

Changes in the system of simple proportionality are likely to be made on the following points:

-On the conditions for participating in 2nd and 3rd allocations. In the past those conditions were either the election of one deputy or garnering 10% of the valid votes in an electoral district. The party was able to participate then in the 2nd allocation of the major electoral district. It is possible that the proportion will be set at 3% for the entire nation.

-Another more significant modification could be made in the manner in which the seats of the 2nd and 3rd allocation are distributed. Namely, that the seats would not be allocated on the basis of the "unused remainders" but on the basis of the parties' total strength.

Other changes that will be made in the electoral legislation-- independently of the system that will be eventually selected--is the redistribution of seats according to districts in the next deputy elections, which was made necessary by the 1981 census.

Finally the new draft of the election law will be accompanied by another draft related to solving some technical problems which have emerged from time to time when elections were being held.

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POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

DIFFERENCES WITHIN CDA PARLIAMENTARY GROUP

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 2 Nov 84 pp 18-22

[Article by Gerard Driehuis and Tom-Jan Meeus: "Who Is the Boss in the CDA? -- Parliamentary Party Member: 'Bert de Vries Does Not Do a Good Job'"; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] That Bert de Vries is nice is something simply nobody /can/ deny. And intelligent. And unimpeachable. But given that Lubbers is showing ever more wear, the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] has an ever greater need for more than that. CDA parliamentary party members are very hesitant to hurt congenial Bert, but yet: "If things go on as they are, are we going to have a choice any longer?"

Reports from a parliamentary party, backrooms, and the Kabouterbar.

With people and especially with power Bert de Vries also managed in the Ruding affair to keep all the CDA sheep once again on the administration's dry path. That is becoming increasingly unusual. The unity, the much praised unity of the CDA exists increasingly thanks to the backrooms. Outwardly those backrooms still function smoothly. By bringing the no-confidence motion against Christian democrat Ruding to a vote very quickly, De Vries was able to prevent desertions in the parliamentary party.

But the question is /how long/ it will be possible to maintain the unity. /The social image of the CDA/. A gruesome term; you can have an image without being it. And yet, you will only be a parliamentary party member of the CDA, and week after week you will see a widening of the gap between the CDA and virtually all social groups which concern themselves with distribution and justice. The tension between the official parliamentary party line and the small left wing is starting to run dangerously high. So high that several factions within the parliamentary party are already holding separate meetings.

Waning Popularity

But there are more reasons to suspect that the success of Operation Unity will be temporary. Lubbers' popularity, the sole electoral weapon of the CDA, is waning. The latest survey of the popularity of Lubbers and the administration

(in the monthly "Politieke Barometer" from DE TIJD and the Inter/View Agency) was done before the Ruding affair. It can be assumed that the figures published here have only gotten worse. And to get a good understanding of the figures attention should be given to the score achieved by Lubbers and his administration among CDA voters. Among them, Lubbers' rating has dropped "almost spectacularly," as a staff member of the Inter/View Agency noted.

Table 1: Popularity of the Administration

	All	PvdA*	CDA	VVD**	No party choice made yet
October	5.5	4.5	6.8	6.9	5.6
September	5.6	4.6	6.9	7.0	5.8
June	5.8	5.1	7.2	6.8	6.0
May	5.5	4.7	7.2	6.8	5.7
April	5.5	4.8	7.1	6.8	5.4
March	5.4	4.4	6.9	6.6	5.7
February	5.8	4.9	7.1	7.0	5.5

* Labor Party

** People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

Table 2: Prime Minister's Rating

	All	PvdA	CDA	VVD	No party choice made yet
October	6.0	5.1	7.4	7.3	6.0
September	6.2	5.1	7.7	7.4	6.4
June	6.5	5.7	8.5	7.4	6.7
May	6.0	5.2	8.1	7.5	5.9
April	6.1	5.2	7.9	7.1	6.1
March	6.0	5.9	7.9	7.1	5.9

The (unpublished) breakdown shows that among a group of CDA voters this assessment has dropped far below standard. Even though there may not be a division in society, this division is coming increasingly to light within the CDA electorate. There is still a group of voters within the CDA -- estimated at about 20 percent -- which considers the CDA a people's party. This group's doubts about the correctness of its choice are taking on increasingly sharp forms. And if the CDA were to lose that group then the CDA would virtually by definition lose its majority at the next elections.

Hence those people must be reassured. It is true that the government is harsh, but it is social anyhow; something along those lines. And in order to make that clear, the parliamentary party will have to have more to offer than is the case now; that much is clear to everyone within that parliamentary party. And this has led to the main subject of quite a bit of CDA nonsense (since Ruding is synonymous with policy): Bert de Vries.

Two years ago, when Bert de Vries was about to be elected parliamentary party leader, the members of that parliamentary group were still sufficiently afraid. It had only been a short time ago that, under the inspiring leadership of Piet Bukman, Operation Unity had been launched. At the time no sensible person, and thus certainly no CDA parliamentary party member, would have gotten it into his head to express any doubts aloud about anything whatsoever, and certainly not about the leadership. Everyone agreed with one another by decree. Now, 2 years later, the consequences of an attempt to rob 45 reasonably intelligent people of their own opinion for a few years is becoming ever more visible. In the meantime, two CDA parliamentary party members have started on their own. Three parliamentary party members on the left have only one ambition left: to get away respectfully. The right wing (which is now 14 strong) meets occasionally in an establishment incidentally called /De Kabouterbar/; and in the meantime the question of who leads the CDA has become a subject which has very openly been declared a topic of conversation. In this respect the parties are in complete agreement: Bert de Vries is in any case /not/ that leader. As it seems that no effort is too much for the CDA leaders (with H. Onno Ruding as their resplendent champion) in breaking the last ties with the unions or other leftist organizations, the social image (the very term alone...) of the parliamentary party will have to be established. And given that everything is supposed to happen in unity, Bert de Vries will/should play the main role in this. And it is /that/ that many conversations are about...

The parliamentary party colleagues can no longer tell it now without a sense of humor. About how it went when a new parliamentary party president had to be chosen in late 1982. There were enough candidates, but barely any candidates with /any chance/. The left wing and the right wing were so far apart that both sides declared the other's candidates beforehand as without any chance. And there were few really able types in the center. Actually only one: Gerrit Gerritse, the former union leader who combines membership in the Second Chamber with about 10 or so supervisory directorships in industry.

It seems as if nothing would ultimately keep Gerritse from the parliamentary party leadership until, during the decisive meeting, Henk Couprie, in one of his lucid moments, asked a smart question: would Gerritse be willing to give up his directorships if he were to become parliamentary party president? The answer was short: no, he was not willing to do that. After which the parliamentary party then scrapped Gerritse's candidacy and the search for a president was continued in desperation.

And since then, after all the fussing about "unacceptable" candidates from whatever wing, they have been aiming primarily for a /safe/ personality. Someone of unimpeachable (political) behavior. Which meant that the matter could yet go in all directions. And thus the colorless former university

economist De Vries, as the representative of the least expressed opinion, became parliamentary party president.

For a long time our political commentators were able to dish up plausible explanations for the positioning of "respectable" Bert in the center of the CDA. De Vries was often described as the proper servant of Lubbers, pushed forward by the CDA leaders specifically for that job. It could fit.

But lately De Vries' behavior has experienced a somewhat remarkable change. Having apparently become troubled by the servant role always being meted out to him, the parliamentary party leader is beginning to act more and more like a politician of consequence. Several of De Vries' parliamentary party colleagues do have explanations for that. And they locate the sore spots of the CDA parliamentary party reasonably well.

"Then You Go Flapping About"

"Bert knows what I think about his presidency," said a more than average parliamentary party member, "and therefore I can tell you too. I don't have any problem with that."

After which the storm broke loose.

"He doesn't do a good job. Bert is too dependent on a few colleagues, such as Gerrit Gerritse. That cannot be allowed. A parliamentary party leader must make decisions based on his own points of view. Well now, I have never yet been able to catch Bert expressing a clear position. He listens to the various opinions within the parliamentary party and then usually places himself precisely in the middle. Then you go flapping about. Because you don't have real leadership. That will fall apart. At the right moment the affair runs aground."

As the number of people we talked to grew, the story began to sound more and more familiar to our ears. It is no more than a simple truth: the CDA parliamentary party is having trouble with Bert de Vries. People find him nice, truthful, and a good colleague, and knowledgeable. But they cannot fathom him. And the CDA parliamentary party, which in recent years has become addicted to its own supreme position, would once again like to be counted. A few quotes from our sessions. From the right wing: "If you have a problem Bert is barely accessible. He does speak to you in a very friendly manner, but that often doesn't help you very much. But you certainly don't find out exactly how the power play works. It sounds funny, but at times like that you're better off putting your ear to the ground near Ed Nijpels. When you have first heard the story from Bert de Vries and if next you get information from Nijpels, then you get the correct picture. With Bert alone you don't really find out."

From the left wing: "He is a short term thinker. The big lines for the long term are lacking with him. He probably simply lacks the political insight for that. And take his stories about the welfare state. There is no line in them at all. Absolutely nothing. Well, when you hear that then gradually the feeling comes over you that he simply doesn't know it, that the economy will always and forever remain his only area of expertise."

And from the center: "Such a speech at the time of the general considerations, that is indeed not good. It fades into nothing compared to the stories from Nijpels and Den Uyl: Bert cannot touch those. Of course, it is all solid and well thought out. But it doesn't fly. There is no line in it. And -- should I say it? -- you also regularly get the feeling that he doesn't know what he is talking about... But I admit: it could also be that I underestimate him a little."

Parliamentary Party in Power Vacuum

The latter cannot be excluded, but nevertheless things do not seem to look very good for Bert de Vries. The general feeling is that the parliamentary party is currently being led through an interim period. Because, while he himself is showing increasing evidence of discomfort when a servant role is once again imputed to him, within his own parliamentary party lists of potential successors are being circulated galore. Not that they are planning to push De Vries aside unceremoniously in the interim. But it does indicate that a return by De Vries as parliamentary party leader after the elections is virtually excluded within its own ranks. Hence it is no accident that numerous party colleagues are talking about De Vries' great qualifications for the position of /minister of social affairs/.

But for now Bert de Vries is still leading the parliamentary party. And this simply means that this same parliamentary party finds itself in a power vacuum. Outwardly, the factions are swarming around in a friendly manner. But in the meantime one wing is meeting with some regularity, the other wing is pondering the future and the middle is seeing its intellectual and political base caving in.

That the right wing of the parliamentary party has become more selfconscious seems clear from the fact that some of them do not even want to deny that there is indeed talk of regular meetings in the /Kabouterbar/. "We occasionally go and have a beer there with a number of our colleagues," they first said, as if the meeting of the CDA group was based solely on a desire for conviviality. That is not always true. "No, of course we also talk about politics. And we have occasionally made an appointment, yes. That is sometimes necessary to restrain those leftwing boys a little. Ha ha!"

Indeed, they occasionally make appointments. Once, a short while ago, there was even a kind of formal meeting of 14 members of the right wing.

At the beginning of the parliamentary year they had agreed to meet in the Kabouterbar. The new election of the parliamentary party leaders would soon be on the agenda and here and there within the right wing they felt that a reshuffling of the leadership was definitely to be recommended. As confidante of the right wing, Rene van der Linden could of course stay on the committee. There was less unanimity about Huib Eversdijk, let alone about Rob van der Toorn. The Kabouterbar-dwarfs felt that Van der Toorn, who had stuck out his neck a little too much during the nuclear arms debate, had to go. And whether this was by chance or not, they got Bert de Vries on their side. "You don't do your job well, Rob. If I were you I would no longer offer myself for re-election to the parliamentary party committee," said De Vries to his colleague

parliamentary party leader, and since then Van der Toorn has told virtually all his parliamentary party colleagues that De Vries had spoken to him in those terms. With the added question of whether they also felt that way.

At that time, according to some of his colleagues, Van der Toorn was already aware of the Kabouterbar action. And he must have thought that the only effective way to counter that was to have as many more or less friendly fraction colleagues as possible make a concrete statement about it. Once this had occurred, it was very clear to the right wing that for the time being Van der Toorn could not be displaced. And Bert de Vries had to watch Van der Toorn present himself for reelection.

"If that is the way it is," a CDA parliamentary party member summed up, "then I know something else. Then all of us will abstain, so that Van der Toorn will also feel what is going on."

No candidate opposed Van der Toorn. In the end 14 parliamentary party members abstained. The right wing was not in command yet then, but people had to realize that it /existed/.

And now that we are talking about that anyhow, the left wing also /existed/ for a long time. But does it still /exist/? Leftwing individuals involved cannot be moved to a very enthusiastic response. Well, it may be true that over the last few months the parliamentary party has acted remarkably and happily as if united, but for the left wing this phenomenon has become the source of all evil. In this respect, Jan Nico Scholten and Stef Dijkman have given the other leftwing members quite a bit to think about. The left wing is caught in the CDA trap.

"What now," one of them asked in despair. "You can cause problems at the elections, but the only result then is that you get angry faces and that people no longer listen to you. And that doesn't do you any good. The only thing you can do then is to try to turn things around within the fraction. Only... the level! It goes like: can we pay that -- no? -- okay, done. No depth, /none at all/."

Nice Little Successes

If today there is an organized /right/ wing, there were times when the CDA had more than a /left/ wing on paper. However, in spite of much greater unrest in today's left wing of the parliamentary party, there is only chaos, lack of clarity and distrust in that camp. "How big is the left wing still? You want figures, numbers? I don't know. One person will suddenly act very loyal out of pure opportunism, another is already held fully spellbound by his future as mayor, yet another is simply going to leave parliament in 1986... It is sad, but the left wing is likely to slowly fall to three or four people. No more."

Nevertheless, today's divided left wing has a good deal of power. In the past, desertions have proven catastrophic for the CDA, and therefore a great deal is given up now and again to keep the left wing on board. As a result of which the smallest wing within the parliamentary party is sometimes able to bring in some nice little successes.

A "loyalist" from 1984 said: "A situation like the one with the real minimum income for adults: the fact that in the end full purchasing power was found for this for 1985 is to a not insignificant degree due to us. Originally, Gerritse and Weijers had made an agreement with Jan de Koning that only a limited compensation could be granted. Those two simply arranged that; Bert or the parliamentary party were not involved at all. And this was the way it was presented in the parliamentary party committee on social affairs. But then we really made an agreement with a few people to the effect that we would not accept that. Well, then you notice that you have something to say. Because if on such a critical issue they run the risk of having a few people fall out of the boat, then everyone comes around. Including Gerritse and Weijers who -- it simply makes you sick -- work out everything with Jan de Koning ahead of time. But to get back to those minimum incomes: that is being secured after all thanks to the left wing."

How Much Longer?

The only question is how much longer the left wing will continue to be satisfied with its little short term successes as palliatives, while there is so much deep dissatisfaction with the administration's policy in general. Discouragement has seriously struck here and there: some people have simply given up and are looking for another job. Others have specifically made their membership in the Second Chamber the central element and are currently playing the loyal ally of the parliamentary party. And a third small club within the left wing is considering an offensive.

"If we tackle sensitive issues," one of them predicted, "we will go quite a ways. Take nuclear energy. Everybody seems convinced already that things will probably go the way proponents Lansink and Van der Linden want. Well now, I'm not so sure about that. There is a whole set of arguments -- the fuel program, the social discussion, the waste problem -- which cannot simply be set aside. Thus, other issues are going to play a role shortly. And then I want to see whether we couldn't tackle one of those issues to show our real face for once. Lubbers may be in his harvest year, but it is time that the left wing also scores a few points."

And thus a single leftist member could still make things quite difficult for Lubbers in the coming months. As a matter of fact, Lubbers also has to deal with about 20 percent of the CDA electorate which characterizes itself as progressive. And in recent months they have been talking more and more often about those 20 percent within the left wing: "The CDA cannot dismiss them." It is a somewhat roundabout way for the leftwing members to defend their own political line. "Electurally speaking, the CDA cannot get around the left wing within the parliamentary party. Then they would yet sell out those 20 percent. That is impossible, and thus the left wing will always continue to exist. That is a legality which the CDA cannot escape by any stretch of the imagination. Hence, I do understand why Lubbers is suddenly saying that cooperation with the PvdA after 1986 cannot be excluded. But I am skeptical about the real significance of such statements. I don't know..."

It is clear that some parliamentary party members are no longer waiting for that. They talk with nostalgia about times gone by when the left wing enjoyed direct contacts with the leaders of the PvdA parliamentary party. At that time there were regular contacts between a PvdA delegation led by Wim Meijer and a group of CDA members of parliament, among whom Jan van Houwelingen (now secretary of state), Bouke Beumer (drifted off to Strasbourg) and Sytze Faber. And a part of the small left wing seems to be thinking about that now with /more/ than nostalgia.

A parliamentary party president who is emphatically seen by his own people as an "intermediate pope," an increasingly closer organized right wing and a small left wing with a tendency toward rebellion: thus things could become pretty exciting around the outwardly so orderly CDA parliamentary party during the coming months.

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POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

STRATEGY, POSITION OF VVD GOVERNMENT COALITION

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 15 Nov 84 p 7

[Article by J.M. Bik: "VVD on the Edge: Hard Line or Businesslike Approach"; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] "No, Ed is doing fine. If I didn't think so, I wouldn't say so here either. Ed is still as independent, as free as a bird; he is in such high favor that they cannot touch him for the time being. His life is much more difficult than mine, much more. He is involved with a much larger club, with young people who knew absolutely nothing about it when they joined, with a prime minister who gives the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] less room than did the prime minister of the administration in which I was vice prime minister; hence it is all much more difficult."

This quotation is from political veteran Hans Wiegel, the 43 year old Queen's Commissioner in Friesland, VVD parliamentary party president in the Second Chamber from 1971 until 1977 and vice prime minister in the first Van Agt administration (1977 through 1981). The subject of the critique in the HAAGSE POST of 25 August last was Ed Nijpels, the leader of the now 36 strong VVD parliamentary party. There is a great deal of truth in Wiegel's judgement, even though there is the question of whether it would be formulated precisely the same way 3 months later. Because, since the VVD parliamentary party leader last summer rather clearly emerged as the winner on points in the cruise missile debate with the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] duo Lubbers/De Vries, a great deal has changed through the instrumentality of the prime minister, the CDA parliamentary party and Nijpels himself.

On the first day of the opening of the new parliamentary session and the following days, Prime Minister Lubbers, the top man in the CDA, came under fire about the presentation or content of the administration's plans regarding (adult) minimum incomes, ministerial salaries and the income of the crown prince. The political leader of the VVD industriously participated in the shooting; he accused Lubbers, as a kind of honorary member of the opposition, a few times of "psychological blunders."

That this tough and not very friendly approach toward the coalition may have something to do with the fact that the VVD is not doing so well in the public

opinion polls, whereas both the CDA and the VVD have to find their fortune largely on the same electoral market, is remembered more often. People have equally often, and rightly so, noted the circumstance that Lubbers is very clearly number one in his party, whereas Nijpels is the leader and list head of the VVD who has to conduct the electoral fight with Lubbers now and in the near future and who furthermore has to keep the liberal ministers on course.

The latter refers specifically to Vice Prime Minister Van Aardenne and the minister of justice, former VVD President Korthals Altes. The vice prime minister is rather a technical minister (economic affairs) than the purebred politician Nijpels needs for his skirmishes with the CDA, while his relationship with the prime minister has retained a certain laboriousness from the past. The minister of justice does not specialize in playing second fiddle, let alone third fiddle, as the young director Nijpels has already noticed, specifically during the cruise missile debate.

Growth

There is yet another factor which has contributed substantially to the sabre rattling which Nijpels has engaged in since the opening of the new parliamentary session, specifically the temporary VVD cruise missile success last summer and the manner in which this came about in the dealings with Lubbers in this case.

First a few figures about the growth of the VVD and the altered parliamentary power relationships between 1971, the year in which Wiegel made his debut as list head, and Nijpels' debut in 1982:

Table: Second Chamber Elections

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
VVD	16	22	28	26	36
PvdA[Labor Party]	39	43	53	44	47
CDA					
(CDA Parties)	58	48	49	48	45

What jumps out is that over a period of 11 years, the VVD has reduced its 42 seat lag compared to the Christian democrats to 9, actually to 7 as Messrs Scholten and Dijkman have left the CDA parliamentary party. The certain relatively major setback of the CDA, with maintenance of power in the center, and the substantial growth of the VVD produced a problem of choosing between growing (rapidly) bigger than the CDA and reacting nicely together with the CDA. Both can be done at the same time, but it is difficult.

In any case, this problem of choice keeps liberal strategists and personalities divided. Should the parliamentary party take a hard line against the CDA, with the risks of government compromises concluded between VVD ministers and their CDA colleagues, or be a cooperative partner as was the case in the days of Vice Prime Minister Wiegel?

During the last week of last summer's missile debate prior to the decision of 1 June, the cabinet definitely chose the hard line. Following the development a week earlier among the CDA leaders of the opinion that a passable compromise for the Christian democrats could be achieved with Nijpels, the more hardline faction within the VVD parliamentary party (the name of its deputy chairman Evenhuis should be mentioned here) struck.

Threats for publicity purposes were coupled with internal affirmations to the effect that the VVD would really cause a crisis if Lubbers did not come around and pull one of the other variants out of his pocket. Which occurred during a tense week. As a matter of fact, to the surprise of numerous people who were a few days "behind," such as the CDA minister of foreign affairs who was just in the process of selling an earlier variant in Washington. Given the weight of the issue and the credibility of the VVD pressure, the crisis threat proved effective.

The political quality of this government decision was also great for the VVD, because -- this is the plausible line of thought -- if in the fall of 1985 the CDA says yes to the deployment of cruise missiles, the chance of a coalition with the PvdA in 1986 will be lost or at least seriously damaged given its absolute rejection of deployment.

Last May/June, the VVD leaders emphasized the hard line toward the CDA not only as a usable tool but also -- and here begins the misunderstanding -- as a more or less permanent usable tool.

Misunderstandings

That was a misunderstanding for more than one reason. First of all, a permanent hard VVD line is harmful to the government and to the cohesion of the coalition (and thus to the VVD itself) and it cannot be acceptable to the CDA. Secondly, it is not credible if it is used in dissensions of little real content -- such as in the double income question --, because there must be credibility both for the CDA and the VVD's own (potential) voters. Since then the VVD parliamentary party has learned through phone calls and letters that this was not the case. Thirdly, a constant use of hard methods as was the case last summer fails to appreciate the nature of the cruise missile decision made at that time.

As a matter of fact, the VVD hopes to be able to keep the CDA "captive" as a coalition partner next fall /following/ a positive deployment decision, but it would do well to realize that this possible prize in the future forces it specifically /now/ to maintain the coalition with the CDA.

Prime Minister Lubbers is undoubtedly aware of that and for that reason alone he will be able until next fall to put roughness from the VVD side in perspective. Or even to help reverse such roughness, as he has done in recent weeks, to the obvious loss of the VVD. This was clear not only in the debate about double income earners, but also in the debate about protection of purchasing power for long term minimum real income earners, even though in both cases what was involved was obviously not merely political tactics.

In the dissension about double income earners the above mentioned assessment mistake by the VVD fraction was worsened even more by the fact that Prime Minister Lubbers was absolutely not inclined to whistle the CDA parliamentary party back from its labor allowance amendment with an "unacceptable." This would also have been difficult given that parliamentary party President De Vries had signed the amendment; and given that De Vries was angry because his VVD colleague Nijpels had accused him of being unreliable, and vulnerable because at the same time the weekly DE TIJD reached the conclusion, based on anonymous information from CDA parliamentary party members, that another fraction president was wanted.

Powerlessness

Meanwhile many people are ready to celebrate Nijpels' recent public atonement -- "we are once again going to approach the CDA in a businesslike manner" -- as now confirmed powerlessness. Related stories are making the rounds. Criticism within the VVD rank and file. The weekly discussions between parliamentary party leaders and liberal government officials are functioning moderately well. As political leader Nijpels himself should have taken Minister Smit-Kroes under his wings against the serious accusations in the matter of the PTT [Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Administration] distribution made by party colleague/Queen's Commissioner Vonhoff, then she might not without Nijpels' knowledge have appeared in the Second Chamber with her defense, which was out of place there.

Nijpels should have calmly awaited the report from the RSV [Rhine-Scheldt-Verolme] Committee before defending Minister Van Aardenne, because politicians from other parties are also expected to be criticized in it. Etcetera.

Powerlessness? Nijpels is 34 years old; at the last elections he won 10 seats and is recognized within his parliamentary party as the unchallenged leader. As a young parliamentary party president Wiegel made the mistake (in 1972) of helping to inflate the Biesheuvel administration in the hope of being able to continue later on, thanks to a more favorable electoral verdict, with the same coalition (with KVP [Catholic People's Party], ARP [Antirevolutionary Party] and CHU [Christian Historical Union]) and without the DS'70 [Democratic Socialist Party]. Instead, there followed 5 years in the opposition (until 1977), during which at least in the beginning CHU parliamentary party President Kruisinga fairly often vied with him and the Haya van Sommeren/Van Riel duo on and off wanted to act on behalf of the liberal board of guardians.

If there is a certain parallelism between then and now, then it would suggest caution before making a judgement on Nijpels' ultimate political capability. Even though he may (temporarily?) once again deal in a more businesslike manner with the CDA, his parliamentary party leadership will never be, or be able to be, like that of Geertsema, Wiegel or Rietkerk (1977-1981). But they did not control 36 Second Chamber seats either, and for that matter this week's penance represents more of a temporary armistice than a peace declaration to the CDA.

It remains to be seen whether the new businesslike approach will survive the spring.

POLITICAL

NORWAY

LIBERAL PARTY DECISION TO SUPPORT LABOR STIRS DISSENT

Party Leader Dorum on Cooperation

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 24 Nov 84 p 19

[Article by Nils Ottar Ask: "Softhearted Man and Political Animal"]

[Text] Name: Odd Einar Dorum. Occupation: party leader and part-time position as college instructor. Age: 41. Family: wife and two children, 7 and 10 years of age. Residence: apartment in housing cooperative in Skoyen, Oslo. Car: no, does not have driver's license. But wife has car. Income: 175,000 kroner. Favorite food, drink: has dangerous weakness for layer cake. Likes to drink mineral water. Hobby: reading, especially science fiction. Also relaxes with comic strips, Donald Duck and Prince Valiant, among others.

It is not so easy to find Odd Einar Dorum when we go to the Liberal Party's House. Lots of doors in a corridor but none with the party leader's name on it. No receptionist who asks if we have an appointment. A door without nameplate is open just a crack. It looks dark and deserted inside. In front of the window, however, against the waning daylight, we catch sight of his silhouette behind a desk which is crammed with papers. Empty seltzer bottles and paper cups protrude here and there. Not one of the neatest offices. Also stacks of paper on the floor and overpacked bookshelves along the walls.

Dorum is finishing up the final preparations before the party's national committee meeting over the weekend. The national committee will confirm the local organizations' widespread wish to have the party become part of the government together with the Labor Party after the election next year. No less than 16 counties have backed it. The others agree that the Liberal Party must work for a change in governments but will go no further than to act as a support party for a Labor Party government.

Dorum's Line

It is Dorum's line which has gained ground during the long and thorough discussion of this issue in the party. Dorum is among those in the Liberal Party

most oriented toward the Labor Party but is at the same time the strongest advocate of a middle-of-the-road alternative. But as long as the Center Party and the Christian People's Party have chosen the Conservative Party, a middle-of-the-road government is not a realistic alternative today. And in a choice between a government dominated by the Conservative Party and a Labor Party government, Dorum feels that the Labor Party is preferable, even though the two parties disagree in several areas. But concerning what, in his opinion, ought to be the main task today--social security for everyone and the fight against unemployment--he feels a much stronger bond with the Labor Party than with the policy the current government stands for.

Political Animal

Odd Einar Dorum has been described as a political animal in the sense that he is unreservedly political in all his activity. The label could probably have been accurate in the 1960s and 1970s as well, when he stood on the barricades and was among the genuine activists in political activity. We find his name in several protests against the construction of power plants and especially in the Common Market issue.

Moreover, few have been so involved in nonpartisan grass-roots movements as Dorum. Many local politicians in Trondheim wished he were in the back of beyond when he kept on organizing protests against automobile traffic in urban environments.

The fight for a good urban environment in Oslo will, in addition, be among his most important issues when he runs an election campaign next year for a Storting seat from the capital city. He is already in full swing, and before election day he will know the city districts' problems and wishes better than most of the local politicians. Dorum is not one of those who takes things lightly when he makes up his mind about something.

Softhearted Man?

But even though it may look as if politics is the most important thing in Dorum's existence, we also catch a glimpse of a softhearted man behind the facade. Right after he was elected to the Storting in 1977, he created quite a stir when he applied for paternity leave. He wanted to be present during the birth of his second child and then take care of the housework for the initial period afterwards. Dorum is the first Storting representative who took advantage of this right.

[Question] Now you are setting your sights on getting back into the Storting. Will you not soon start to become tired of politics? Does not the social worker in you say that there are other values here in life than flying all around the country from one rostrum to the next?

[Answer] Politics has been very important to me over the years. Earlier I suppose it was maybe correct to call me a political animal. But I have gradually gained an increasing sense for other values. My family especially means a lot to me. But to be involved in politics the way I am today takes its toll on family life.

Person With Strong Sense of Duty

[Question] But you are not obliged to keep it up this way. Would it not be more pleasant to drop politics altogether?

[Answer] Yes, I have given it some thought. But I feel that through the Liberal Party I am working for values which will benefit people and make life better. The problem with me is that maybe I am a person with too strong a sense of duty and passionately involved in too many issues at one time. Then it becomes hard to follow things up. But political work also gives me pleasure. I feel that the Liberal Party has now carved out a line of thought and action which will make the party more significant in Norwegian politics.

[Question] Are you not afraid that possible government collaboration with the Labor Party could stifle the Liberal Party?

[Answer] No, we will not enter into government collaboration just to get a few ministry posts. Our offer to safeguard a Labor Party government will have as a precondition that it becomes a government which stands for something other than a pure Labor Party government. In such a situation, we will insist on influencing the policy which is pursued. The voters decide on the influence we will have.

Security

[Question] The Gallup figures are not too positive for the Liberal Party at the moment. How are you going to increase support and occupy a crucial position after the election?

[Answer] Social security for everyone and employment are the most important tasks today, in the Liberal Party's opinion. We will also promise the voters a strong effort to protect the condition of the watercourses in the country and to fight against pollution. In addition, we will work for more personal initiative in the development of trade and industry than the Labor Party stands for, and we want a more open and flexible society. Equality and providing safe conditions for children to grow up in will also be significant issues for the Liberal Party.

[Question] If a joint Labor Party and Liberal Party government comes into being, how many ministries will it be reasonable for the Liberal Party to get?

[Answer] I do not want to have any part in speculating about such things. The important thing for the Liberal Party right up to the election is to tell the voters what we stand for and what we will fight for. I have strong hopes that we will strengthen our position when the voters acquire a respectable knowledge of our policy.

Gro Is Fair

[Question] What do you think about Gro Harlem Brundtland who, in that case, will become prime minister in a Labor-Liberal government?

[Answer] She strikes me as being a very strong leader type. She has been clever at getting a large and wide-ranging party to pull together. It seems okay to me that now and then she becomes involved and quick-tempered. You cannot spend your entire life with figures and decimals. I also imagine that she is tough and demanding to work with, but that she is fair at the same time.

No Ulterior Motives

[Question] With a testimonial like that, you are probably counting on obtaining an extra ministry for the Liberal Party if there is government collaboration.

[Answer] I have no such ulterior motives at all. The Liberal Party does not intend to ingratiate itself with anyone. On the contrary, we will lay our cards on the table and indicate clearly what we mean and stand for. We will not enter into government collaboration and get run over the same way the Center Party and the Christian People's Party have been.

Party Executive Confirms Decision

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Nov 84 p 4

[Article by Odd Inge Skjaevesland: "Liberal Party Wants to Rule With Labor Party and Influence Labor Party Policy"]

[Text] The Liberal Party's national committee confirmed over the weekend the party's growing interest in collaborating with the Labor Party after next year's Storting election. By a vote of 30 to 3, the national committee supported government collaboration with the largest opposition party "in a parliamentary situation which makes it natural." The Liberal Party has not received any signals that the Labor Party is interested.

"In the meantime, neither the leadership nor others in the Labor Party have spurned government collaboration with the Liberal Party," said parliamentary leader Hans Hammond Rossbach at a press conference yesterday.

The Liberal Party would greatly prefer to form a government with the Christian People's Party and the Center Party but realizes that it is not possible after the election next autumn. When the party now turns to the Labor Party, it is because the Liberal Party believes that the opposition Labor Party has changed itself for the better.

"We also want to participate in such a government in order to prevent the Labor Party from running the show alone. Even though we are small, we want to

have a hand in determining the course," Rossbach pointed out at the press conference. He expressed regret, however, that the party with which he wishes government collaboration would not contribute to a more just election arrangement.

Party chairman Odd Einar Dorum stated that there is disagreement in the Liberal Party on choice of course but agreement on Liberal Party policy. He is allowing for a temporary decline in the opinion polls as a result of the fact that the party has now come out openly in favor of collaboration with the Labor Party.

No one in the party leadership wants to indicate exactly how many Storting representatives the Liberal Party must get in order for it to be able to make possible demands for positions in the government. Nor will it disclose any ministries it favors. "We know that the Labor Party is not used to collaborating. And that is a problem. But the Labor Party realizes that in the long run it will not be able to obtain a Storting majority alone. Therefore, it has to collaborate with one or several middle parties," emphasized Rossbach. The Liberal Party will not enter into an electoral pact.

In a statement, the Liberal Party's national committee criticized the Government for inadequate guidance in environmental policy. The party believes that the environmental interests were losers in the Etna/Dokka affair and in the Government's announcement on energy conservation, among others. In addition, the national committee wants to decrease the interest rate of the husbank [state building fund for financing the construction of small private houses] by 1.5 percent and increase the basic loan and the establishment loan.

Party Storting Group Divided

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Dec 84 p 5

[Article by Odd Inge Skjaevesland: "Liberal Party in Storting Divided Over Support for Labor Party"]

[Text] The Liberal Party's Storting group is divided in its view of whether the party should support the formation of a possible pure Labor Party government after the election next year. Parliamentary leader Hans Hammond Rossbach wants the Liberal Party to enter the government with Labor but not have any responsibility for a pure Labor Party government. Mons Espelid does not want to rule with the Labor Party but does, on the other hand, back the formation of a Labor Party government.

Rossbach's view has support in the great majority of the Liberal Party's national committee, which a good 2 weeks ago advocated government collaboration with the Labor Party. After getting in a few moderating elements, Espelid also voted with the majority.

Bound

"I disagree about centering attention on government collaboration. But I feel bound by it and respect it," says Mons Espelid to AFTENPOSTEN.

The Storting representative from Hordaland says it may be difficult to draw attention to Liberal Party policy in a possible collaboration government with the currently largest opposition party. "The influence cannot be great as a support party," he stresses.

In order for it to be feasible for the Liberal Party to rule together with the Labor Party, Espelid feels that the party must at least double its representation in relation to today's two Storting representatives.

His parliamentary leader, Hammond Rossbach, has said that if the Liberal Party is rejected as a government partner by the Labor Party, the party has no responsibility for a pure Labor government. To this Espelid says:

"When we have chosen a new course, we must also be willing to support the formation of a Labor Party government. When we say we are interested in government collaboration with the Labor Party, which in itself indicates a change of course, it is reasonable to support the formation of a pure Labor Party government.

"If we go out in an election campaign and say we are interested in entering the government with the Labor Party, it becomes difficult to explain to the voters why we will not support a Labor Party government, even if we ourselves do not join it," says Espelid.

Merging Views

Espelid supports the change in course because he thinks that the parties have had merging views on the most important issues for the Liberal Party in this Storting period: health care and social policy, capital transfers to counties and municipalities and efforts against increased unemployment.

"But if the Christian People's Party and the Center Party are more independent after next autumn's election, there is reason again to look more closely at middle-party collaboration," thinks Espelid.

"Does this mean that after the course change the Liberal Party wants to bring with it a possibly 'more independent' Christian People's Party and Center Party into a large coalition government with the Labor Party?"

"Nothing will happen before the 1985 Storting election. But it can become a pattern for collaboration in the longer term. After all, chairman Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Christian People's Party has said that his party is closely aligned with the Labor Party on certain issues," emphasizes Mons Espelid, half of the Liberal Party's Storting group.

POLITICAL

WESTERBERG PRESENTS IDEAS FOR LIBERAL PARTY CAMPAIGN PLATFORM

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Nov 84 p 6

[Article by Dick Ljungberg: "Right and Left Liberal Party Profiles"]

[Text] "The Liberal Party's profile is good but hard to pinpoint. We stand for social responsibility, but also believe in the market forces. The Liberal Party's profile should probably be viewed from two directions; sometimes the nose points to the left and sometimes to the right, but it belongs to the same face."

This is what Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg said when he presented the party leaders' general political agenda for the national party congress, which will convene in the People's House in Stockholm 23-25 November.

The Liberal Party is concerned about signs of initial corporatism in Sweden. Certain interest groups have gained too much power at the expense of the political and the private sphere.

"For example, the Danish Federation of Labor (LO) has a great deal of influence on the Social Democratic Party, while the Center Party and the National Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF) are closely connected," said Westerberg. "The Center Party's seat on the Provincial Committee can be attributed to LRF."

The Liberal Party wants to restore balance between the private, the business and the political sectors. In order to strengthen the politicians' hand, the party wants to initiate a power investigation. Such an investigation has already been made in Norway to establish the influence of various interests and how the various interests are kept in balance.

Much of what the Liberal Party leaders have written to the effect that politicians interfere too much and that the individual's freedom to shape his own life is being diminished could just as well have come from the Conservatives.

Same Nose

But the Liberal Party is pursuing something of an intermediate position, the same nose points in two directions:

"We reject the political line of the Conservative Party to the effect that all parties say "no" to greater political influence as well as the Socialists' line refusing to set any limits on the growth of the political sector," said Westerberg.

"Even the tax burden puts limits on the individual. The tax burden should be reduced to 50 percent so that the individual can keep 'half of the kingdom.'"

"A somewhat greater use of individual contributions to the social welfare system should be tried. The Liberal Party has already proposed increased personal contributions to the unemployment fund, but this might be extended to other areas without jeopardizing the basic social welfare system."

Direct Elections

"A number of public monopolies should be broken up, like Televerket's exclusive right to provide telephone service and related equipment. Bids should be employed to a greater extent and government subsidies should be designed to allow private enterprise to compete on the same basis as the public sector.

"Democracy needs to be stimulated by more directly elected municipal councils and by splitting up some of the larger municipalities if the residents in question wish it.

"Freedom of expression should be strengthened through greater protection of informants, even among private individuals, the abolition of radio and TV monopoly and the termination of adult movie censorship."

Sabbaticals

"The issue of reduced work hours will be among the most important at the national congress. The entire party leadership agrees that all future productivity gains should be taken out as shortened work hours. The majority feels that the individual should determine how the shortened hours should be taken out; it may be a shorter work day, a flexible retirement age, "sabbaticals," etc.

"Among the party leaders, nine women have expressed reservation about this and want the hours shortened on a daily basis, aiming for a 6-hour day.

"The family policy is also expected to create a great deal of debate. For example, there is some reservation about greater right to leave of absence for child care.

"As usual, the alcohol policy is of great interest to Liberal Party members. The interest primarily concerns three new restrictions, but the three who

have expressed reservation, including Jorgen Weibull, feel that 18-year olds should be part of the System.

"There is also demand for a new popular vote on whether nuclear power should be written off for all time, but most of the party leaders do not go along with this. Liberal Party leaders also plan to debate whether monarchy should be abolished, whether to ban the exploitation of prostitutes, whether to abolish the use of grades in schools and whether to raise the limit on foreign aid.

"It is peculiar to the Liberal Party that a whole section of motions concern the Baltic. More precisely, there are eleven such motions, nine of which have been signed by parliamentary representative Karin Ahrlund."

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

VPK CHAIRMAN FORCED TO BATTLE FOR POST AT PARTY CONGRESS

Defends Aid to Socialists

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Jan 85 p 8

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Lars Werner's Advice to Government: Social Democrats Must Stop Leaning Toward Right"]

[Text] "Stop leaning toward the Right," was the advice that the leader of VPK [Left-Party Communists] Lars Werner gave the social democratic government when the VPK on Wednesday opened its party congress. In the opening speech he said that the labor movement must go on the offensive together and unveil the Conservatives' backward-looking policies which are hostile to wage earners and dangerous to life.

Disappointment with the present government's policies is great within the labor movement, proclaimed Lars Werner in his more than hour-long speech. His advice to the government was to give up hope of any help out of the crisis from business or the hawks in the Employers Association. Instead, invest all your powers in creating new, meaningful work. Take charge of the record profits which the capitalists are not using to create new work. Use them for accelerating social construction: build dwellings and day-care centers, expand the care for the sick and the elderly, and so on. Finally, begin to reduce working hours. That is needed, and it will give jobs to the unemployed.

Another of Lars Werner's many bits of advice to Olof Palme was to review the distribution policies. Attack speculation, stop reducing the extra property taxes and the taxes on the highest paid. Instead reduce the value added tax on food and use society's limited resources to support the economically weakest groups.

Stop increasing military expenditures, and instead restore the one percent target for foreign aid, and also increase the aid for the starving in Ethiopia and Sudan.

These measures should contribute to stimulating the total labor movement against the conservative forces, said Lars Werner.

Choice of Ways

Before addressing his wish list to the Social Democrats, Lars Werner devoted a large section of his speech to all the evils which a nonsocialist government would create.

The election in the fall will be the most important in many years, said Werner. It is an inevitable choice of ways for the future.

The VPK leader said that it will be a hard choice. We have gone forward. Social Democrats have gone backward.

If the nonsocialists win the election, with the help of the Center Party, the Liberal Party and God, Sweden will be governed by a conservative, according to Werner. And if the nonsocialists do half of what they have said, it would have drastic results. They would not only tear down much of what the Swedish labor movement has built up, they would put social development on a dangerous course. The three conservative parties would undo as much as they could of the public sector--day-care, hospitals, schools, homes for pensioners, communications.

Internal Criticism

And taxes would be reduced, but for those with large incomes, property, houses and capital. At the same time they would abolish housing allowances, food subsidies, subsidies for health care and medicine, support for the handicapped, unemployed and low paid.

Lars Werner also took up the internal criticism within VPK, including criticism of himself and his way of leading the party.

General agitation for socialism is necessary, but it will never be credible if it can not be combined with concrete results in the daily struggle. The entire history of the socialist movement teaches us that he who forgets today will have to be satisfied with capitalism in which to reform.

Lars Werner was still ready to admit that the party is not capable of living up to its often high ambitions and goals. We and the entire labor movement have been hard pressed by rightwing forces. We have not managed to devote ourselves to all the questions that we should have. We have been entangled in short sighted decisions and party work without perspective.

Werner defended the arrangements with the Social Democrats. He admitted, however, that the demand to end the value added tax on food should have been pursued more energetically. At the same time he pointed out that VPK contributed in raising the child allowances and was responsible for halving the gasoline tax of 50 ore. The government was forced to withdraw three bills.

In his self-criticism Werner also admitted shortages in the organization. We have not been able to recruit new members as we should. Our strong support among the youth has declined, as has our support among women.

But still Lars Werner claimed that VPK is a workers' party and not a party for art teachers. Much more than half of the members are organized in LO [Federation of Trade Unions] and TCO [Central Organization of Salaries Employees], he said.

Lars Werner was concerned that the Conservatives are making inroads among youth. We have not been able to turn back the Conservatives' new campaigns, and furthermore the capitalistic crisis has placed obstacles in the way of the possibilities for women to get work and training.

Party Secretary Hammar Quits

Article: HÅMMAR QUITTER in Swedish 3 Jan 85 p 8

Article by Magdalena Ribbing: "Demand for Better Party Leadership"]

[Text] Criticism of their own party leadership became the main topic when the VPK delegates spoke out freely on Wednesday afternoon and evening.

There were swings both within and outside the party leadership, mostly concerning the arrangement with the Social Democrats which resulted in increased apartment and gasoline taxes.

Party chairman Lars Werner admitted former presumptuousness, but said that he is now humble, and was applauded.

Red Banners

With the red banners as a background, one delegate after another rose to the speaker's platform, which for the occasion was converted to the congress speaker's platform. The point of departure for the first debate of the congress was a narration of activities during the time since the last congress. It was roundly criticized, but approved after a long debate.

Alec Carlberg, Stockholm, considered that the present party leadership was too anonymous for the members, and demanded better leadership for the party.

"When I sometimes notice that party comrades in the leadership use valuable time to cast suspicion on each other I become furious," said Alec Carlberg.

Shortage

Lennart Melin, Stockholm, called the narration of activities "a catalogue of failed activities," and complained about the shortage of reports of contacts with a number of opposition and liberation movements.

Ulf Nymark, Skane, had the same criticism, and wondered about the connections which VPK has abroad. More than half of these were directed at East European countries or places near the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union. He also questioned whether it is reasonable for VPK to allow the inviting party to pay for the trip.

"Has the party leadership considered our credibility in these cases?" asked Ulf Nymark, and continued by asking what the VPK members did on visits abroad to, for example, bring up the Soviet Union's many crimes against human rights.

"It seems remarkable to me that VPK was present at the funeral of Brezhnev and Andropov. Why were we present on these occasions?"

One-Sided

Concerning party secretary Bo Hammar, Ulf Nymark replied by saying that he was right:

"Our contacts are one-sided. But the new and enormous thing which has happened is the development of international connections between us and a number of West European parties."

To those who criticized the lack of reporting of criticism of the United States' invasion of Grenada in the narration of activities, Bo Hammar said that VPK was not surprised at the United States' actions:

"But when a country in the name of the proletariat takes over another country, eliminates democracy and rights and sets up military government, then we are surprised and we react very strongly. We unified our party in a strong criticism of events in Poland.

Bo Hammar said that it is VPK's duty to try and stop an extreme rightwing government, which Sweden now risks, and about the criticized cooperation with the Social Democrats he quoted a Finnish party colleague who said that in order to test whether a marriage is going to last it is sometimes necessary to jump in bed together.

Vivi Niva from Gallivare said that as an old communist he would not like to jump in bed with a rightwing Social Democrat. And the party delegates laughed for the first time that day.

Like many speakers, Vivi Niva was against the arrangement with the government. The delegates from Kalmar, Jarl Kulow and Sven Strom were ordered as floor members to criticize it. They had nothing against cooperating with the Social Democrats, but the agreement hurt those worst off, contrary to previous party congress decisions.

Jorn Svensson represented the party leadership and said that it would have been harder for the worst off in society if VPK had not driven the government

before it had obtained a hearing for a number of days. Mr. Stenroos said emphatically that the government was surprised at the criticism that it had assumed.

"Even though we have no love for Bjell-Olof Feldt, it would have damaged the government badly if we had not gone into the arrangement. Then we would have had an increased budget deficit, increased unemployment, and an increased opening for a violent neo-socialist attack.

Next speaker

Hans Andersson, member of the Party leadership and chairman of the war veterans in Sweden, believed that most of what the Party leadership did was wrong. The arrangement with the government turned 10,000 Swedish kroner into 100,000 Swedish kroner for the Party. He was convinced that the Party leadership was not the leadership that the party deserves, and he was upset that VPK is preparing a "white paper" on why the demand for reduced value added tax on food was not pushed. Neither had the party leadership done anything to strengthen the backbone of the membership during the hard campaign against the wage earner funds, said Hans Andersson.

Party chairman Lars Werner late in the evening had renounced his red earnest line from the previous months but he acknowledged to have a deep fear that the Party would be a very conservative or limited leader.

"I do not say that all of everything, or that we have made any mistakes, but I do not believe that the Party has been able to do anything more in the last years than to 50 are more in headline tax, but there are other things. Besides, it was a rather good arrangement with the government."

Lars Werner also admitted that it would have been fortunate if the party leadership could have consulted with "comrades across the country" before the historic arrangement with the Social Democrats went into effect.

"I am rather socialist, and have not always been. I have been cocksure in my day. And when I say that we perhaps made a mistake on the question of the value added tax, it is not pleasant to have that questioned by my comrades in the party leadership. I believe that it is a very serious thing, at a party congress."

For that, party chairman Werner was loudly applauded.

Submissive

Tommy Lindfors, Goteborg, complained about VPK's submissiveness on the question of possible soviet submarine violations. He claimed that the submarine commission appointed by the government made a simple and deficient report which only indicated violations by the Warsaw Pact, but not at all at NATO. Indications point just as much to NATO, claimed Tommy Lindfors.

"It would be unfortunate if our party should support this congress."

Hammar Goes

On the first day of the congress there was much talk about two people who are leaving the leadership. Party secretary Bo Hammar confirmed that he is leaving his post because he was not successful in reaching out sufficiently to the membership across the country, among other things. Roger Karlsson, PhD, member of the board of directors and paper chairman from Hammaro, also confirmed that he is leaving the party board of directors, but would not admit that the reason was other than personal--illness in the family and other things. But, he said from the rostrum:

"I have belonged to the minority in the party board of directors who abstained on the arrangement with the government about the gasoline tax--it was a very bad arrangement, and I still think so. These have also been 3 very bad years for the Swedish labor movement."

Tension in Congress Hall

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Jan 85 p 8

[Article by Kaa Eneberg: "Red Banners in the Riksdag"]

[Text] At the last minute, just before the Greater Stockholm VPK Orchestra played the congress fanfare, party chairman Lars Werner on Wednesday rushed into the Riksdag assembly hall.

Clearly stressed, but joking about the critical debate over his leadership, and with the symbolic flower of the communist movement, a red carnation, bright in the buttonhole of his dark suit.

The splendid Riksdag hall has now for the second time been converted to the site of a congress for a political party, with all of its symbolism. On Wednesday a bundle of flags consisting of four red and one Swedish shone on the podium and in the foyer. The speaker's platform was adorned with the slogan of the congress, "The Left Shows the Way," and bouquets of carnations decorated the podium.

Last autumn the assembly hall was decorated in the Conservative Party's blue and white symbols and Swedish flags.

Only the Nordic so-called brother parties were invited to participate in the party's 27th congress. For example, representatives of the battling Stalinist party minority from Finland were not invited. Neither were official representatives from the Soviet Union, who are usually invited to communist congresses. On the other hand there were plenty of Soviet observers in the press gallery.

There was no mistaking the general mood when delegates from the entire country began filling the assembly hall during the hour before the start of the congress. An especially warm welcome greeted Eivor Marklund, who left the posts of vice chairman and member of the Riksdag for municipal politics in her home town of Kiruna. She was also elected to lead the deliberations during the 5-day congress, which was expected to be a tribulation for several comrades.

Clenched Fists

Bo Hammar, departing as party secretary, did not seem as eager for battle as Lars Werner. He sat silently beside confident Eivor Marklund and listened to the program of music which opened the congress.

Despite all the tension and personal intrigues the congress, as it should, sang "The International" as if they were a strong unified group. Norrlanders and Goteborgers and others with raised clenched fists. Both Lars Werner and MP Jorn Svensson, who has openly criticized Werner's leadership, refrained however from raising their fists.

Stockholm chairman Kenneth Kvist urged the party comrades in their political work "not to allow themselves to be drawn into the establishment of the non-socialist community," and to work for a true development of the Left in politics.

And when it was time for party leader Lars Werner to go up to the speaker's platform, he saw his comrades who had gone out for a smoke or other reasons file back in to fill the assembly hall. When Werner as MP and party leader comes to the Riksdag speaker's platform it is usually the opposite. Then most of the Riksdag's 349 members go out.

Editorial Roundup on Congress

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Jan 85 p 9

[Text] The VPK congress

FOLKBLADET (Social Democrat) of Norrkoping says that the ongoing VPK congress can not change the fact that the VPK has failed to create a blue and yellow communism between social democracy and severe Leninism:

"The VPK congress can obviously discuss long range socialist strategy as much as they want to, but we hope that the delegates do not forget that in a few months we will have one of the most important Riksdag elections in a long time. That requires responsibility and realistic insight, even from VPK."

OREBRO-KURIREN (Social Democrat) believes that Lars Werner is VPK's greatest asset, and his critics would lead the party out to a new wandering in the wilderness:

"But Lars Werner comes from the labor union movement. He has stood out in the everyday reality of production. It is obvious that a party leader of that kind will maintain order, even in VPK."

VESTMANLANDS LANS TIDNING (Liberal) says instead that it is easier ideologically for VPK to work as the party of the dissatisfied than to compromise in the Riksdag:

"The problem of internal dissension and power struggles has deeper roots. A party with a revolutionary ideology must cultivate its traditional ideas with care in order not to disappoint its followers. VPK has long demonstrated that a policy of unashamed overbidding is easily combined with the heritage of Marx and Engels. But it becomes significantly more difficult when the party leadership sits down to compromise with the government."

BORAS TIDNING (Conservative) compares the ordinary politician Lars Werner with the ideolog Jorn Svensson, who does not conceal the meaning of socialism as a value system:

"Even if the Swede Werner both says and believes that his revolution will take place with a popular majority in a general election, the same majority can be sure that the power would never be voluntarily returned. Neither does anyone need to doubt that comrade Werner and others, who eventually would stand in the way of the continuing dictatorship of the proletariat, would quickly be removed."

Hammar Defended Ties With SDP

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Jan 85 p 9

[Article by Magdalena Mellbourn: "Angry Hammar on His Departure--Campaign Against Me Was 'Shabby'"]

[Text] "Politics are shabby, everything should go through a magnifying glass before it comes out," said Bo Hammar, VPK's departing party secretary.

But he is not sighing, on the contrary he is angry in an energetic way about a number of events in politics and within the VPK.

"A shabby campaign has taken place here," said Bo Hammar:

"There are elements of this campaign which conflict with political morals and above all with the morals which should prevail in a Communist Party.

"An example is that during the years that I have been party secretary there has been no criticism of me within the party board of directors. But now, just before the party congress, criticism is appearing in different newspapers, although not in our own NY DAG, and demanding my departure. That is shocking."

Bo Hammar, 43, was persuaded to become VPK's party secretary when the post was vacant 3 years ago. There was what he describes as an enormous campaign of persuasion, and he reluctantly accepted:

"VPK was low in the opinion polls before the 1982 election. I felt a responsibility, mostly toward Lars Werner with whom I had cooperated a lot. But everybody knew that it was not a job which I wanted to have for a long time. Being party secretary is not the world's most pleasant and comfortable job."

One month ago Bo Hammar told his children in the presence of former party leader C-H Hermansson and Lars Werner that he wanted to resign. He would perhaps go back to journalism again, to NY DAG where he hoped his former job would still be there for him. But today he has no clear picture of his next job.

The prevailing self-criticism within the VPK is good, said Bo Hammar:

"But on the other hand it is easy to make policy when one has the answers at hand. Policy must often be created in one day."

At the VPK congress many voices have been raised against the party's arrangement with the Social Democrats. Bo Hammar is one of those who thinks that the cooperation is good:

"We are showing that besides our hard criticism of the government's policies, we are also trying to move farther and show that we are ready to work toward the goal."

Stop the Right

And that goal is mainly to stop a threatening government of the Right, said Bo Hammar--the nonsocialists from 1976 were a mild spring breeze compared with what can happen in 1985, he said.

What are Bo Hammar's wishes for VPK's future?

"Partly that we can participate in and promote popular and political movements for peace and the environment. See who is out and agitating on the streets and market places today--it is SAF [Swedish Employers' Confederation] and not the labor movement. Partly I wish that we could double our Riksdag influence so that we could seriously discuss government policy."

It is not a question of introducing socialism tomorrow, but of changing power and possession, he explained:

"We must have more just distribution and a more living society in which people are more concerned and less separated."

"But I am so limited," said Bo Hammar, "that I do not believe that we will have the revolution tomorrow."

Werner Reelected Chairman

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Jan 85 p 9

[Article by Ake Ekdahl: "Werner After Unanimous Reelection--One Swallow Does Not Make a Revolution"]

[Text] Confidence in Lars Werner's leadership is outwardly undisturbed. The VPK congress elected him on Thursday as party chairman for a new 3-year term. The election was unanimous. An attempted revolt during the nominations evaporated, and Werner was hailed with long applause.

Both before and during the congress Werner took personal responsibility for the mistakes for which the leadership was criticized by the party rank and file. In his speech of thanks following his election as chairman he appealed to the congress:

"From the heart I ask you not to dramatize the role of a person in the party leadership. That would be pleasant for me and good for the party. One swallow does not make a revolution, but together we can turn policies toward the left."

The Right Stuff

As a demonstration against Werner's leadership, the names of three additional persons were placed in nomination as suitable candidates. Nothing like this has happened in modern times within the VPK. The three selected quickly bowed out, and the nominating committee then had only to recommend the re-election of Werner.

One of the three who had been nominated was Lennart Varmby from Vaxjo, a colorful agitator with the right red stuff.

In a fiery speech just before the election of the chairman he brought forth the congresses loudest applause and laughter so far.

Werner listened to this speech from the corridor behind the last row of seats in the hall, and envied this frisky colt in his speech.

"When I heard comrade Varmby I almost regretted that I had not withdrawn my candidacy. I will never be able to stimulate a congress to the dizzying heights to which he took this group," said Werner to the congress.

Werner also said that he did not intend to make any sobbing speech about attacks on his person. He acknowledged that he was aware of his weaknesses, but he also knew what he could accomplish for VPK as leader of the party.

In the long congress debate about a principal document on the party's policies, the demand was many times repeated for a program of guidance for the continuing work in the field.

The VPK chairman in Stockholm, Kenneth Kvist--under consideration as a new MP in the fall--spoke of the desire for some form of written guidance.

He explained to the congress that it is accomplishments which count, and that the basic program which a member of VPK can follow is found in the party platform.

Class Struggle

In the general political statement which the party board of directors has prepared for the congress there is a clear appeal for increased activity in the party. It speaks of broad popular rallying to isolate the Right and high finance.

Former VPK leader C-H Hermansson described the political questions which VPK puts foremost as typical questions of class struggle.

"Labor and capital stand against each other in unrelenting opposition which can finally be resolved only when capital ceases to exist as a social category, meaning through a social revolution," said Hermansson.

He complained that socialist societies are exercising authoritarian wielding of power and encroachments on rights. This can be used in propaganda against all socialism, the Swedish people can be frightened by every reform which restricts the exercise of power by capitalism, said Hermansson.

Treachery

As an offshoot of the broad criticism of VPK's cooperation with the Social Democrats the opposition to collective association flared up again.

Bo Malm from Kalmar demanded legislation against collective association, accused the entire party of cowardice and treachery when last autumn they backed away from legal compulsion.

To this replied Kenneth Kvist that the struggle against collective association of union members with the Social Democrats will be carried out at the workplaces, and not by supporting a bill written by the Conservatives.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

DEFENSE MINISTER HOPING TO REMOVE DEFENSE AS CAMPAIGN ISSUE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 24 Nov 84 p 7

[Article by Lars Christiansson: "Thunborg Opposes Palme"]

[Text] Prime Minister Olof Palme and his closest cabinet advisers want to make security policy differences between the government and the Conservatives an election campaign issue. Defense Minister Anders Thunborg and his staff would rather tone down the differences.

The idea that the security-policy dispute will be carried on into the election campaign next fall continues to grow within the prime minister's office. According to what SVENSKA DAGBLADET has learned, one of the reasons for this is an internal Social Democratic opinion poll. It shows that the government party has gained a great deal of trust in the security policy area.

This issue was also discussed by the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party 19 October and the party's attitude was revealed by the secret discussions during the executive committee meeting. SVENSKA DAGBLADET disclosed the content of the party's election campaign document last Monday. With respect to security policy it states:

"The Conservatives' mud-slinging and casting suspicions create uncertainty about Sweden's foreign policy. Do not let them do this from a government position."

"Outrageous Conservative Campaign"

The prime minister's view on relations with the Conservatives in the area of security policy can be found in a statement made by Palme in a parliamentary debate with Conservative parliamentary representative Anders Bjorck 8 November:

"The Conservatives' campaign is outrageous. It shows a totally poisonous climate within the Conservative security-policy debate. The Conservatives

have lost a great deal of confidence on these issues and it is doubtful that the gulf can be bridged at all," said Palme.

Minister of Defense Anders Thunborg has taken a different position. Speaking in Kolmarden Friday 16 November he said:

"During my years as minister of defense I have repeatedly said in almost every public appearance how improper it is to use security policy as a bat in the area of domestic policy. The fact that I now hear exactly the same thing from Conservative speakers too makes me extremely happy.

"I believe that what has happened in the security-policy area lately can be characterized as a tightening and a broad-based support for traditional Swedish security-policy lines."

Within the Ministry of Defense it is being said that Thunborg partly has in mind the Conservative parliamentary representative Carl Bildt's statement influenced by the Conservative Party, and partly Conservative Party leader Ulf Adelsohn's speech at the Foreign Policy Institute the other day.

Report Next Spring

But there is an entirely different point of view in the prime minister's office. This became clear when the Social Democratic Party, on the advice of the prime minister, abandoned a former Defense Committee agreement and forced a decision to the effect that the committee would submit a security policy report next spring.

One of the basic reasons for this is that the Social Democratic Party will thus force Carl Bildt and the Conservatives to either endorse the report, which will be stamped by the committee's Social Democratic majority, or reject it. From a Social Democratic point of view, should this happen, the Conservatives will have shown that they do not support the traditional Swedish security-policy line.

Thus, the Conservatives are legally the spoils of the debate and the party's credibility with respect to the neutrality policy can also be questioned.

Within the Ministry of Defense it is hoped that the situation can be avoided and that the committee can reach agreement on the security-policy report. The Social Democrats do not anticipate any problems with the Conservatives on purely defense-policy issues.

Credibility Questioned

But during the parliamentary reduction-of-arms debate last week, Social Democratic parliamentary representative Sture Eriksson chose to pick up on earlier security-policy duels with the Conservatives by questioning the Conservatives' credibility with respect to the neutrality policy.

"The fact is that the Conservatives are deliberately trying to undermine the agreement on foreign policy supported by the other parties," said Eriksson.

In the Foreign Affairs Committee's report, which formed the basis for the reduction-of-arms debate, the Conservatives and the Social Democrats had agreed on all the basic features of Sweden's foreign and reduction-of-arms policy, i.e. including the neutrality policy and the Nordic nuclear-arms free zone, for example.

The Conservatives had expressed reservation about the government's point of view regarding the implementation of the nuclear-arms freeze. Otherwise, the differences were hard to discern, judging from the committee's report.

In spite of this, the reduction-of-arms debate was marked by differences between the two parties in that Sture Eriksson harshly attacked the Conservative reduction-of-arms and foreign policy.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

PAPER EXAMINES PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL NONSOCIALIST RULE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Dec 84 p 2

[Editorial: "New Three-Party Government in 1985?"]

[Text] Two new contributions have been added to the already impressive amount of literature covering the nonsocialist government period: the second part of Gosta Bohman's recollections "Change of Power" and Ola Ullsten's contribution to the book "Liberal Ideology and Politics 1934-1984." Both provide quite discouraging reading about crises, conflicts, incompetence and aborted hopes. In these accounts, the 6 nonsocialist years do not seem like a glorious period in our political history. But, at least, what actually happened becomes a trifle clearer.

Following the election victory in 1976, there was never any serious talk about anything except a three-party government. The deep rifts within the new majority were well known, but still the choice of government seemed self-evident, like "an historical necessity" after 44 years of divided powerlessness. Following the 1979 election, the situation might have been viewed differently, but even then the two larger nonsocialist parties were completely bent on a new three-party government. There was no attractive alternative.

But both times, the coalition was completely improvised, without prior arrangements and without a common statement of purpose with respect to government policies. The parties brought with them a range of unresolved issues, together with a great deal of distrust and unresolved attitudinal differences. All the writers agree on the detrimental effect of these inner tensions on the ability to act politically.

The nonsocialist parties should not place themselves in a similar situation once more. They should either establish conditions that would apply to the government coalition ahead of time or refrain from the three-party model and opt for another form of government in the event of an election victory. Both of these eventualities require preparation and discussions that cannot begin the day after the election. A new government cannot be a ship with just a sail and no rudder. It must quickly find its course.

In 1982, the Social Democrats had plans that went beyond election day. They were based on the 1981 crisis program. The Social Democrats were

prepared to reorganize the chancery, to submit proposals to Parliament at once and to make decisions.

A coalition government cannot get off to such a flying start. However, the parties should be able to do much ahead of time, despite each party's natural desire to campaign on its own policies.

The first Falldin government took office in the midst of a serious economic crisis, which the Swedish people by and large were unaware of. Most of the people were thinking as they would in good times. Unprepared, the government had to deal with a serious inflation, a range of structural problems in industry and an unchecked growth of the public, primarily the local sector.

It should not be quite as difficult in 1985. The economic-political climate has swung in favor of the nonsocialists. Since 1982, the Social Democrats and the unions have made a brilliant pedagogical effort to create understanding for greater industrial profits, the ability to compete and low wage increases.

A recurrence of the 1976-82 discontentment propaganda is probably out of the question and, in any event, would not have the same effect as then. Whatever happens, one should not forget that the Social Democrats, when faced with an economic crisis, chose to ignore doctrines and concentrated instead on profit incentives and private industry.

With respect to public expenditures, there was already a clear break in the trend at the end of the nonsocialist government period. Municipal and county governments have become adjusted to living with a tax freeze, which is a dramatic change from the seventies.

But public sector financing still remains the big unresolved issue. Those entering government following the 1985 election will soon face the same kinds of problems as did the 1981-82 interim government. A structural deficit in the amount of 20 billion kronor in the public sector must somehow be eradicated, while one also tries to ease the pressure on an overloaded tax system.

There must be substantial changes with respect to subsidies and social welfare, and it will not be sufficient to cut real spending in terms of sick days or reduced inflationary protection, for example. A large part of the social welfare system must be changed over to a regular insurance system financed by premiums.

This is a difficult task which will require years of planning. The Conservatives may have their own plans concerning this and similar issues. The Center and the Liberal parties probably have not thought much about this. If, according to all indications, the three parties are going to try to form another coalition, they should coordinate their arguments now with respect to the issues they inevitably will have to face. It is well that they have formed a joint working group opposing employee funds, but as the only platform for a new government this does not go far.

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

CANADIAN FORCES FOR FIRST TIME IN NORWEGIAN EXERCISE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Dec 84 p 15

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Canadian Battle Brigade to Norwegian Exercise in '86"]

[Text] Brussels, 5 December--For the first time, the entire Canadian brigade which has been earmarked for Norway will participate in an exercise in Troms. This will occur in the fall of 1986 when the so-called "Cast Brigade" will join with the "N. Brigade" in the Barfrost exercise.

It was the new Canadian defense minister, Robert Coates, who made this announcement at a press conference in Brussels on Wednesday when he outlined the guidelines for the defense policy of the new Canadian government. According to Coates, there is a new policy whereby appropriations for Canadian defense will be increased in the coming years. Further details on this will be presented in a white paper during the course of 1985, but he was able to say now that the Canadian forces will be increased generally by 10 percent--from 82,000 to 90,000. But the increase in Canadian forces in Europe may be even larger, according to Coates. This pertains both to the size of the forces and improvements in particular weapons systems (such as defenses against low-flying planes) and switching over to more effective fighter planes.

The Canadian "Cast Brigade"--which, according to plans, is to be sent to Norway by means of combined air and sea transport during a crisis--never has been in Norway previously as a fully-constituted battle brigade. Only certain smaller divisions have participated in exercises and to a limited extent, and therefore, doubt has arisen over the ability to move the brigade quickly enough should the occasion arise, and whether there is a political willingness in Canada to fulfill the obligations which are being undertaken.

Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad, who met with his Canadian colleague on Wednesday, states in a commentary that the Norwegians are very pleased that a decision has been made now for the Canadian "Cast Brigade" to come to Norway for the exercise.

Both defense minister Sjaastad and his colleague hope that the substantial expansion of the boundaries of NATO's infrastructure will make it possible to commence construction of supply depots in northern Norway. However, under no circumstance would these depots be ready to receive Canadian equipment in the fall of 1986. For this premier occasion, the Canadians will need to bring all of their equipment with them in big rowboats.

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

NORWEGIAN, FRENCH NAVAL EQUIPMENT COOPERATION--Larvik, 6 December--"This is gratifying and positive news. This contract will be extremely important to us in the long run," administrative director Kare Hansen said in response to the news that Simrad Subsea of Horten had signed a joint contract with Thomson-CSF of France for the production of new sonar equipment and Norwegian frigates and corvettes. The total amount of the contract is 94 million kroner. Simrad Subsea will be responsible for about 40 percent of this, which corresponds to over 37 million kroner, according to TONSBERGS BLAD. [Text]
[Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Dec 84 p 28] 9336

CSO: 3639/56

MILITARY

DENMARK

SDP ORGAN REPORTS ON RECEPTION OF DYVIG REPORT

Reestablished Cooperation Depends on Government

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 29 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Dyvig Report"]

[Text] Today the government is publishing the excitedly awaited report on Denmark's security policy. There are no big surprises, and the report does not prepare for epoch-making new thinking, but is first and foremost an enumeration of a long list of actual conditions concerning Denmark's defense and foreign policy cooperation, East-West relations, etc.

Quite decisive is the fact that the report apparently does not plan in advance on new political confrontations between the government and the opposition regarding Denmark's security policy. However, it is made quite clear that Denmark cannot make security policy decisions which cannot be accepted beforehand by the partners in the NATO alliance, and great emphasis is placed on the fact that Danish security policy initiatives are to take place in agreement with members of the NATO alliance if Denmark is to preserve its credibility.

The most interesting thing will now be how the government will "handle" the report and what the further course concerning it will be. First and foremost, how the treatment of the report will be in a special Folketing committee. It is totally up to the government and the non-socialist parties whether the report and its further handling will result in reestablishment of the former longstanding broad cooperation regarding Danish foreign and security policy.

'Limited Satisfaction' Main Response

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 30 Nov 84 p 13

[Article by Bjarne Kjaer: "Only Moderate Satisfaction with Dyvig Report"]

[Text] The report from the Foreign Ministry's committee of experts regarding Denmark's security policy has been received with moderate satisfaction by most quarters. From effusive favor from the non-socialist parties to a positive reception by the Social Democratic Party. The Socialist People's Party,

Socialist Left Party and the Radical Liberals are far from satisfied, and the Socialist People's Party and Radical Liberal Party, among others, have turned sharply against the fact that the report from the Dyvig Committee was released to the public before the Folketing's members got their hands on it. This resulted yesterday in the fact that the Radical Liberal Party's foreign policy spokesman, Arne Stinus, flatly refused to comment on the report.

The Social Democratic Party's chairman, Ex-Prime-Minister Anker Jorgensen, characterizes it as a first-rate report.

Descriptive Report

"There are many sensible reflections in it. It is, of course, descriptive in most areas, but it is only quite simply that a committee of officials made it and in a number of areas a position is not taken on the questions discussed, where political weighing is to take place."

"We look positively on the Dyvig Report, although we in part need answers to a number of questions and in part have to say that we disagree on a number of points," Anker Jørgensen says.

Must Accept Resolutions

"Now we will examine the report in a special Folketing committee. I hope this task can result in broad support for Denmark's security policy. But there will not be agreement on all points if the government does not display obligingness in quite decisive areas or accept those things which ended up in the security policy resolutions passed in the Folketing," the Social Democratic Party chairman says.

The Conservative Party's political spokesman, Lars P. Gammelgaard, characterizes the report as the best conceivable basis for the discussions which will take place regarding Denmark's security policy.

"It stresses the need for solidarity in NATO. We hope that the coming discussions end in agreement on the security policy. This should take place with complete consideration for NATO," he says.

The Liberal Party's foreign policy spokesman, Bjørn Elmquist, cautions against too detailed commentaries on the report.

"The report contains momentous and matter-of-fact elements, but if we first go too much into details now we risk becoming locked in and tripping up the objective discussion in the Folketing's ad hoc committee," Elmquist says. He thinks it necessary that the committee take the necessary time to discuss the report.

Socialist People's Party: Yes to Nuclear Weapons

"With the Dyvig Report the government admits what the Socialist People's Party and the disarmament movement has maintained all along: that Denmark cannot

receive NATO reinforcements without at the same time saying yes to nuclear weapons," the Socialist People's Party's defense policy spokesman, Pelle Voigt, says. According to the report, a no to nuclear weapons will "create insurmountable difficulties for allied defense planning and entail a general detachment from the alliance's general strategy."

"We must henceforth state that successive governments at this point have deceived both the Folketing and the people," Voigt says. He believes that the report confronts the Folketing's security policy majority and the disarmament movement with an important challenge. "We must begin to discuss the content of an alternative security policy which makes Denmark independent of the NATO reinforcement forces and their nuclear weapons," he says.

The Progressive Party's Group Chairman Helge Dohrmann says that the report "confirms that the many and long security policy debates in the Folketing regarding Denmark's security policy [as published] have been conducted on a basis which can only be characterized as quite detached from reality." Denmark's NATO membership and the security associated with it ought not to be questioned for the present, he says.

The Socialist Left Party's Keld Albrechtsen says that the report does not contain anything essentially new. On the contrary, it paints the familiar pictures of the enemy which were the basis for NATO's establishment. He thinks that the Dyvig Report is strikingly reminiscent of the management report titled "A Question of Credibility."

"It is those same views the Dyvig Committee and the government parties think we must take so seriously that they are becoming the only basis for the continued debate on Denmark's security policy," he says. The Socialist Left Party thinks that the report can be used just as an illustration of the USA's views. If the Social Democratic Party accepts the report as the basis of a new truce with the government parties it will not only be a regrettable continuation of the pickle jar [put-aside-and-neglect] policy, but a direct security policy step backwards, Keld Albrechtsen thinks.

No Alternative to NATO

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party) on behalf of the government sent the report to Folketing Chairman Svend Jakobsen (Social Democratic Party) with "a provisional commentary from the government." He believes that the report shows how strongly Denmark is in an inextricable situation in relation to the East-West difference, which we have to live within and at the same time must try to overcome. He emphasizes at the same time that there is just as little alternative to NATO today as there was in 1949.

However, Ellemann-Jensen says that "when Denmark must manifest such fundamental importance to membership in the alliance both militarily and politically, relations with our partners in the alliance, with whom we share security, also become of equivalent fundamental importance. The solidarity principle accordingly gains a significance which it is the government's feeling it is important not to fail to appreciate. If we do fail to appreciate it, we also diminish

the breakthrough strength of Danish viewpoints, Ellemann-Jensen says. He says, incidentally, that the Scandinavian countries have not chosen common security policy solutions and also can hardly do so.

"This is an appealing, but not realistic, alternative," the foreign minister says.

Norwegian Labor Party Backs

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 30 Nov 84 p 13

[Article: "Norway Agrees"]

[Text] The Dyvig Report regarding Denmark's security policy situation expresses in the main the leading viewpoints of Norway's security policy, Labor Party Foreign Policy Spokesman Guttorm Hansen says, who is also vice-chairman of the Storting Foreign Affairs Committee. He says further that the defense of Norway, too, depends on allied reinforcements in wartime.

"We have taken the consequences of this by, among other things, stockpiling heavy military equipment for a brigade of American marine infantrymen in Central Norway," he says.

In addition he refers to the fact that the Labor Party as early as 1982 submitted a proposal for revision of NATO's nuclear weapons strategy, among other things, to get the doctrine regarding the first use of nuclear weapons changed.

8985

CSO: 3613/50

MILITARY

GREECE

'NEW DEFENSE PROGRAM' SEEN FAVORING TURKEY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23-24 Dec 84 pp 1, 15

[Article by Nik. Emm. Simou "Armed Forces Disposition Not Dictated by NATO"]

According to the evaluations of reliable military sources the new "defense dogma" is nothing but fireworks with dangerous long term consequences precisely for our national interests as well as the nation's credibility. And this because on the one hand it does not mean some kind of redistribution of the Greek [armed] forces and on the other hand because the pompous way in which the government wanted to convince threatening Turkey of some allegedly new defensive positioning of the Greek army gave it the right to claim already...that it is supposedly threatened by Greece.

The talk surrounding the "defensive dogma" stems from the fact that since 1974 the Greek armed forces already have been governed by two schemes. Scheme "E" which looks to the disposition of the Greek forces to face an immediate threat--in this case Turkey--and the NATO scheme which looks, theoretically at least, to how Greece will participate and act jointly with the other allied nations to repel a danger from the north

The same military circles note that in view of the conditions Ankara has created for decades in Greek-Turkish relations the possibility of a realization of the Turkish threat has oriented the readiness of the Greek armed forces willy nilly in the direction of the East, and not only in theory. And it has thus become an old story, which even the common soldier knows, to clamor that an essential element of the modernization of the Greek defense policy is the imminent implementation of a new dogma without delay, implying in fact that for a decade Greece has been unprepared to meet the Turkish threat from the standpoint of military strategy.

At this point, however, it is worth remembering excerpts from the speech the then minister of defense, M. E. Averof, gave on the occasion of the Rogers agreement debate in parliament about Greek armed forces rejoining the military branch of the Alliance. Among other things, Mr. Averof had said:

"There are three categories of forces, with a few subdivisions among those. One is the force that member nations have put at the disposal of the NATO commander. And we have there another two subdivisions: the forces which are at his entire disposal and those that are at his disposal under certain conditions.

"The second category is the one that has been earmarked for assignment. And finally there are those that are called 'other forces.'

"Those are put at the commander's disposal by the decision of each member-government. But he cannot demand: 'I want so many men.' Naturally, if you are a member and say: 'I will give none,' there would be such an outcry that you would have to contribute something. But the size of your contribution is up to you.

"Second point: there is a binding agreement which was also signed by Greece as well as all the other allies, to the effect that at the beginning of each semester or in case of a national emergency a member is entitled to withdraw its forces even from the first category and even to include them in the category which is under the control of the National Administration.

"Consequently, there is no question of our sparing an excessive force, except if what Mr. Papandreou curiously implied is true: that we have treacherous intentions and will give away all our forces and renounce any possibility of getting them back.

Disposition of Forces

"The same applies to the forces' disposition. Their disposition, except for those of the very first category (that is those of the subdivision which is under his [the commander's] orders and which for all the countries is usually a small one) is decided upon by the staff of the member government. If for instance Greece believes that there is a threat against the islands of the Ionian sea and the NATO commander says there is no such threat, the Greek administration is free to proceed with the disposition according to its own evaluation of the threat."

Management

Furthermore, it must be noted that the existence of another plan for the distribution of Greek forces in a definite direction does not detract at all from the applicability of the other NATO scheme which is, actually, more favorable with regard to the probability of implementing [Scheme] "E". In fact, in both instances, in case of a "general alert"--that is, of a war--mobilization affects the armed forces as a whole. With the result that there is no question whatever for the Greek side--nor for the PASOK during whose three years of government Greek participation in the elaboration of NATO military schemes has continued--of a denial of a redistribution of the Greek armed forces, in accordance with the emergency plan of the Atlantic Alliance.

On the other hand, from the military standpoint at least, a disclosure of a nation's defensive plans is seen as uncalled for, even more so if the way it was made was not in the nature of a warning but...to gratify the anti-NATO and anti-American feelings of the government party's left wing. And the worse part is that the attempt at "promoting" into a dogma the wise defense policy

followed by previous governments gave Ankara the opportunity to hide behind the "new defensive dogma" to shift onto Greece the blame for tension in the area. And to be able to exploit in the long term and to the utmost a Greek indiscretion as a factor preventing detente in the area.

Turkish Exploitation

Furthermore, the "new defensive dogma", according to the same military circles, reinforces the constant Turkish efforts to obtain for the Turkish armed forces the operational control of the Aegean--within the framework of NATO--a demand favored by Greece's abstention up to now from exercises. And this because to the absence of Greek military forces from the exercises, which justifies Turkey's petition to fill the Greek gap also, is added the resounding refusal of NATO defensive schemes, which puts Turkey in a favorable position within the Atlantic Alliance.

The gravity of the proposals of the "new dogma" theory is reflected in the intense interest shown by the president of the republic in connection with the changes in the army, with the result that the two leading politicians met again barely a week after they had met so that Mr. Papandreou could inform Mr. Karamanlis on his recent trips to Rome, Dublin and Brussels.

12278

CSO: 3521/125

MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEFS

MILITARY OBSERVERS IN CHAD--There are in all ten high ranking Greek officers in Chad who, together with French officers, oversee the withdrawal of Libyan forces from that African nation. According to the information military sources gave VIMA the Greek officers' mission in Chad is that of "mere observers" and they will not intervene under any circumstances. The announcement as to whether the Libyan forces will leave Chad or not will be made by the two nations involved, that is, Libya and France. [Text] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 22 Dec 84 p 3] 12278

CSO: 3521/133

MILITARY

NETHERLANDS

CHANGES IN TOP NAVAL PERSONNEL IN 1985

Amsterdam DE TELEGRAAF in Dutch 21 Nov 84 pp 1,7

[Article: "De Ruiter Gets Rid of His Top Navy Officials"]

[Text] The Hague, Wednesday -- The minister of defense, Mr J. de Ruiter, and his secretary of state for defense (equipment), J. van Houwelingen, have sent the top people in the Royal Navy on their way -- over a period of time.

Both the chief of the navy staff and commander of the naval forces, Vice Admiral J.H.B. Hulshof, and the director for equipment, Rear Admiral Kool, will be able to clear out next year when their service time officially comes to an end anyhow.

They are not being offered an opportunity to work a while longer with the Ministry of Defense, as is often the case with top military personnel who reach the age at which they can retire. The director of economic management of the navy staff, whose name is also Kool, will also disappear next year.

Walrus Affair

The background reason for this "phasing out" of the navy staff is the "Walrus affair." It recently came out that a sum of 940 million guilders is involved in the construction of two new supermodern Walrus submarines, hundreds of millions more than had originally been anticipated. The political leaders of the department, minister and secretaries of state, have placed the responsibility for this failure specifically on the navy because it failed -- although not intentionally, according to the government officials -- to inform the political leaders of the department of this. "The information was provided too late," said Minister De Ruiter in response to questions from parliament, "too slow, incomplete and with too little care."

Meanwhile, Rear Admiral C.H.E. Brainrich von Brainrich-Veldth has been appointed to succeed Vice Admiral Hulshof. Shortly new directors will be appointed for the directorships of economic management and equipment of the Royal Navy. Recently a new director for personnel was already named. According to the minister and his secretary of state it is possible that with a temporary filling of the vacancies "a new experienced team will be able to take on the tasks." As far as the current team is concerned, it is known that its relationship with the minister and the secretary of state is very bad, which

is partly due to personality differences. The directorates of equipment and economic management of the Royal Navy will also be reorganized.

From the minister's responses it further appears that "the Royal Navy had more information at its disposal during construction than it provided. This was not done intentionally. The relevance of getting a general picture or making decisions at the ministerial level was not recognized within the Royal Navy, so that information was delayed or not provided at all. Consequently, adjustments were no longer really possible."

According to the government officials, the heart of the cost increases for the Walrus submarines was the fact that the technical consequences of the operational requirements were underestimated. As a result, the simultaneous development and construction of the submarines became a hard process to control, stated the government officials. The Walrus submarines serve to defend lines of communication at sea which are vital to the Netherlands and to NATO.

8463

CSO: 3614/34

MILITARY

NORWAY

ARMS PLANT GETS CONTRACT TO MODIFY PENGUIN MISSILES FOR U.S.

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Nov 84 p 4

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] The first genuine step on the road toward an agreement on missile production by Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk for the United States was taken last Thursday when American and Norwegian authorities signed a contract for modernization of a helicopter-borne Penguin missile. The agreement is valued at 30 million kroner. No agreement has been reached on production, nor is it clear how many missiles the Americans are interested in purchasing sometime in the future.

According to the American magazine DEFENSE WEEK, the Americans have asked that the Norwegian Penguin missiles be equipped with retractable wings and with an improved guidance system before they are placed on American helicopters. Thus, the United States is asking that new technology be used on Norwegian missiles.

Undersecretary Bernhard Eggesbo of the Defense Ministry told AFTENPOSTEN that, so far, only an agreement between the authorities of the two countries had been reached. "In the next round the Naval Supply Command, which has negotiated on behalf of Norway, will sign a contract with Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk. I believe that will occur within 1 week at most," he said.

Eggesbo also said that the modification work had a time limit. "The agreement that was signed will be in effect only until next March. Thus, it is no final agreement, but we believe it is the first in a series that eventually will involve large sums of money for Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk. The signing of the modification agreement has brought us a long way forward. It is the result of a long and difficult process involving experts and high-level politicians," he said.

Undersecretary Eggesbo also stressed that the contract signed Thursday involves only adaptation of the Penguin missile to the helicopter. Among other things, it includes a preliminary study of how the retractable wings will be adapted to the missile as well as a number of details that must be worked out before the Norwegian Penguin missile may be used on the helicopter.

At Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk, AFTENPOSTEN was told that a study of retractable wings for the Penguin was made almost 10 years ago. AFTENPOSTEN learned that

they were offered for sale in West Germany and other countries, but so far there have been no sales.

DEFENSE WEEK stated that Grumman Corp of the United States, which will market the Norwegian product, has already decided which wings on the missile will be retractable. In addition, a spokesman for the factory, Joe Vranich, said that Grumman Corp would consider producing the Penguin in the United States on license if the United States decided to order more missiles than Kongsberg Vanenfabrikk could produce. Vranich said that Kongsberg's capacity was 25 to 30 missiles per month and that the United States Navy planned an initial purchase of 272 missiles, with a potential for several hundred more for use by the United States Coast Guard.

The Americans want to use the Penguin on their Sea Hawk Helicopters. This would give the helicopters the capacity to defend themselves against surface vessels while locating and destroying enemy submarines, according to DEFENSE WEEK.

9336

CSO: 3639/56

MILITARY

NORWAY

CONSERVATIVES' HYSING-DAHL CONCERNED OVER NATO SOLIDARITY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Thorleif A. Eassen: "Qualified NATO Solidarity Dangerous"]

[Text] Per Hysing-Dahl (Conservative) has issued a strong warning against weakening solidarity in NATO. "The political compromise on security is based on the fact that all political parties are agreed on Norway's relationship with the defensive alliance. But if various relationships respecting NATO are weakened every day, well, then the compromise is in danger!" The former chairman of the parliamentary defense committee and a Norwegian participant for many years in the alliance's conferences, raised this question: If the NATO alliance cannot show unity and solidarity in peacetime, how then will it be able to tolerate the strains of crisis and war? "This is where our responsibility lies," states Hysing-Dahl, emphasizing that it is only 40 years ago that Norwegian young people were fighting until the feathers flew and were crying for help from the Allies.

We are sitting in the office of the president of Parliament. Hysing-Dahl has much on his mind: unity in NATO, criticism of our greatest ally, attack against NATO solidarity, contribution by European countries to common defense, allied help, weaknesses in our own defense, the freeze, Nordic nuclear-free zone and his wish to get France to join in NATO's integrated weapons systems again.

"First, let me make absolutely clear that all of our efforts in NATO and in our own national defense have one objective--that is, to preserve peace and freedom and to form the basis for realistic negotiations on disarmament. There obviously is a need to be reminded of this," the president of Parliament emphasizes.

"New thoughts still are popping up regarding European cooperation. There is a new revitalization of the Western Union which includes the larger countries."

"We must welcome a practical coordination and rational use of the resources which Western European countries have for defense. But for me, the greatest weakness is not so much that we lack forums for conversation. We already have a number of these in the West."

[Question] "What is Norway's primary concern?"

[Answer] "That we emphasize this single fact: it is only through the existing defense and security cooperation between North America and Western Europe that we can realize sufficient security and guarantee peace. If anyone allows himself to believe that Western Europe alone can amass a sufficient deterrent to ensure security, and enough forces to resist blackmail and a possible armed attack, he is being completely unrealistic, in my judgment--and has succumbed to dreaming."

[Question] "Cooperation does not occur without a hitch."

[Answer] "It is of critical importance that we not create situations which alienate North America and Western Europe from each other. Instead, our first job is to remove those difficulties which have arisen from time to time in the transatlantic cooperative efforts."

France Should Participate

[Question] "What do you have in mind when you talk about improved coordination of Western European defense efforts?"

[Answer] "Among other things, that France once again join in NATO's integrated defense system."

[Question] "How realistic is that?"

[Answer] "France is a European superpower which could make great contributions to our common defense. This issue is a political problem in France. But it appears as if the country, under President Mitterand's leadership, increasingly is drawing closer to the alliance, including on the military level. I am glad about this."

Sharper Tone

[Question] "The U.S. criticizes the European NATO countries for contributing too little to the common defense."

[Answer] "The Americans have good reason for this. There seems to be a sharper tone in this discussion every time it comes up. The latest is the recommendation from the two very highly respected and pro-alliance senators, Nunn and Roth, to the effect that since the European countries are failing to increase their conventional forces at a certain pace, the Americans gradually will remove their troops which today play a critical role in Europe."

[Question] "The proposal was defeated on the first vote in the Senate in Washington."

[Answer] "But it is still lying there," said Hysing-Dahl, "which is to say that it demonstrates the dangerous direction in which the debate on the allocation of NATO expenses is going."

[Question] "How can this disagreement be brought to an end?"

[Answer] "I think that much of this disagreement is attributable to the disproportionate shares on the two sides of the Atlantic."

[Question] "Such as?"

[Answer] "A number of factors come into play. I have in mind, e.g., the difference between conscripted troops and professional troops, and the use of terrain for common exercises, the allocation of purchases of military equipment, etcetera. With the great capacity for analysis which is available in the NATO countries, it would be my proposal that with the help of independent experts from both sides of the Atlantic, we attempt to arrive at comparative shares and definitions. When a common working definition has been found, hopefully we will be able to agree on what must be done to create balance. NATO has a clear insight into the need for an optimum utilization of common resources, and it is here where the most decisive and necessary efforts, joint analyses of need, standardization, joint research and development and division of work must occur."

[Question] "Does NATO have many unfulfilled needs and holes in its military layout?"

[Answer] "Yes, clearly. But in my opinion, it is such that nobody would attempt aggression against a NATO country--that is, under one critical condition--specifically, that the political unity in the alliance is maintained. This involves both friend and foe believing that the collective defense system--from a political perspective--will be able to tolerate the strains of crisis and war. A willingness for unity and cooperation must be shown, which excludes the possibility for a type of limited unity. A will to stand by one's friends must be demonstrated!"

[Question] "Do you have in mind the criticism which is directed against the U.S. from various groups?"

[Answer] "Yes, to be sure, I have our most important ally in mind. We must remember the strong anchorings which democratic values have in the United States," the president of Parliament points out, who continues: "We can disagree with one or another administrator who is in power, but the primary thing for us must be the democratic guarantees which underlie every election in the U.S."

"Those who criticize the U.S. must remember that democracy, law and justice have been accommodated in the U.S. for 200 years, while Europeans in most countries endured despots and class rule."

Draft Deferral

Per Hysing-Dahl points out in addition that the very foundation of our national defense is the draft. "We must not permit the draft to become riddled with holes by means, e.g., of allowing situational military deferment. If such reforms are implemented, the bottom will fall out of our national defense. It is only by means of the draft that Norway can achieve optimum defense resources. We must work toward increasing the percentage of our youth who fulfill their draft obligations and bear the burden, and not allow the percentage to decrease."

Air Defense Deficiencies

[Question] "In your opinion are there serious deficiencies in our defense?"

[Answer] "Yes, there is much which should be improved. The most important deficiency can be summarized in two words--namely, air defense."

[Question] "What types of air defense?"

[Answer] "Air defenses in all regards: naval ships, army divisions, supply bases and installations, personnel centers and bases--but primarily, air bases. In view of what the reinforcement situation is, reinforcements for Norway by and large must be brought in by air. Therefore, air bases must be effectively protected against air attacks," Hysing-Dahl points out, and continues: "This protection is absolutely necessary to be able to receive reinforcements. And it is necessary in order that our own planes would be able to carry out our defense in battle."

Allied Help

[Question] "But will help from the Allies ever reach Norway?"

[Answer] "We must convince friends and foes that we are able to receive help in a reliable manner. What will happen if Norway gets in trouble is a question which answers itself--just ask the earlier wartime fliers."

"It is wise to think about such a situation. An example is that the elected Parliament in Ottawa will agree to take the responsibility for sending youths over long distances to fight and bleed in a foreign country. Before that can happen, we on the Norwegian side must make that possible by coming to the rescue and taking an acceptable risk."

One-Sidedness

Hysing-Dahl has a strong reaction against assertions that it is important for peace for the West to set a good example by disarming. "How can it be realistic and logical that one side can sit down at the table and negotiate on troop reductions when he himself has no troops? It is negotiations which we seek."

Compromise

[Question] "Recently it has been asserted that the parliamentary political compromise on security is in danger of cracking."

[Answer] "As I have noted, the compromise is based on the parties being agreed respecting Norway's relationship to NATO. The alliance must be built upon an unbreakable unity. If it appears that everyday wear and tear is causing split opinions concerning NATO, the coalition is in danger. For me, it is self-evidently clear that nations' collective defense must be based on a unity which works in both directions."

Nordic Zone

The parliamentary representative has a clear answer when we inquired concerning his view of a Nordic nuclear-free zone: "I cannot understand how we can work toward such a zone other than as part of a common NATO effort."

The Freeze

Hysing-Dahl also does not support the idea of a nuclear freeze. "The freeze proposal will complicate disarmament negotiations which fortunately now have the possibility for getting going again on a realistic basis."

"There is a lot of talk about strengthening NATO's conventional defenses in order to be able to lower the nuclear threshold. But simultaneously, there are those who argue for creating technologically advanced weapons which can strike behind enemy lines. If it were not that which the bombers did during the last war, what is there which planes are equipped to do today and why have we in all these years utilized long-range artillery? Why not state it so simply as that it always has been an objective of military tactics to prevent an opponent from moving reserves, supplies and new attack waves forward, and to destroy his bases. It may be discomforting to say that a strong conventional defense has a deterrent effect and thereby ensures freedom. But it is not more complicated than that," Hysing-Dahl believes.

12578

CSO: 3639/46

MILITARY

NORWAY

POLL FINDS GREATER SUPPORT FOR NATO

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Dec 84 p 8

[Article: "Strong Norwegian Support for NATO"]

[Text] Support for NATO among Norwegians is stronger than ever. This appears from a poll which "People and Defense" has been taking for more than 20 years. The figures for November of this year show that 67 percent respond that Norwegian membership in NATO contributes to a safe country.

This represents an increase of 4 percent over last year and is the highest number ever attained since the poll was started in the beginning of the 1960's.

Ten percent reply that membership by Norway in NATO increases the danger for attack. This is the same size group as the year before. Eleven percent respond that NATO membership has no effect--as opposed to 10 percent last year--and 12 percent respond with no opinion. Last year, this latter figure was 15 percent.

In the age group from 15 to 29, 65 percent answer positively, contrasted with 61 percent last year. In the 30 to 59 age group, the figures are 70 percent versus 67 percent, respectively, and in the group composed of age 60 and over, 63 percent contrasted with 61 percent last year.

Conservatives respond most positively respecting Norway's membership in NATO. The figures for the Conservatives are 90 percent (86 percent last year), Progress Party 84 percent (76%), Center Party 78 percent (77%), Christian Democratic Party 73 percent (70%), Liberals 65 percent (66%), Labor Party 61 percent (60%), Socialist Left Party 31 percent (23%). The survey is undertaken for "People and Defense" by Norwegian Market Data A/S.

12578

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MILITARY

NORWAY

CROSS FOX NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM OPERATIONAL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Nov 84 p 10

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] NATO's maritime units will be major consumers of the new communications system that goes under the name Cross Fox. Construction at the three stations on Andoya, at Tarva in Trondelag, and at Aukra in More and Romsdal is complete and the electronic equipment will be installed within the next few days. Joint defense communications authorities believe that the communications network will be operative in early 1985.

Five NATO countries--Norway, Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and West Germany--are working together on the Cross Fox network. The communications system costs 350 million kroner and is part of the NATO infrastructure program. The joint defense communications authorities in Norway have been responsible for planning and for the development of the system's technical specifications, in cooperation with the NATO research center in the Hague.

The chief of the most important NATO fleet in the Atlantic (Strike Fleet), Vice Adm Henry C. Mustin, was in Norway recently. He spoke with military leaders in North Norway and at NATO headquarters in Kolsas. There is reason to believe that the new communications system came up in the discussions.

In peacetime, Strike Fleet consists of naval units from the Second Fleet of the United States Navy. In peacetime, Mustin's fleet is a skeleton fleet that, in case of war or the threat of war, would be upgraded to an allied force of two to four aircraft carriers, a larger number of naval defense vessels, and between 140 and 380 combat planes. According to plans, Strike Fleet could be assembled in the North Atlantic in a maximum of 10 days, depending on the situation elsewhere in the world and the need for aircraft carriers elsewhere, such as in the Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean Sea.

The Americans emphasize the need for good communications for their forces wherever they may be in the world. Cross Fox will be a key link in the communications system.

After international bidding competition, the contract for the electronic portion of the Cross Fox communications system went to the RF Communications division of Harris Corporation in the United States. This portion of the system is estimated to cost 250 million kroner. NERA of Elektrisk Bureau will be used as a subcontractor.

MILITARY

NORWAY

COUNTRY'S ONLY MILITARY GAS MASK MAKER IN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Nov 84 p 64

[Article by Berit Hegna]

[Text] "It is ironic that we must resort to laying off 30 workers when we produce something of which there is a clear shortage in this country, namely gas masks and filters. If we do not receive subsidies, we must close down this division during the first half of 1985," said Cato Frimann, marketing chief at Helly-Hansen A/S in Moss, the only firm that produces gas masks for military and civilian use in Norway.

Over the years, the firm has produced more than 1 million gas masks for military, civilian, and industrial purposes. Development work on the "people's gas mask" began in 1958. Four years later a compromise had been reached that provided effective protection at a reasonable cost. In 1965 the company began producing filter cartridges for the masks in three sizes, plus a size for children as young as 3 years. In cooperation with the Defense Research Institute, Helly-Hansen's own research division has now developed a protective system for children--an incubator that is attached to an adult's gas mask. So far, however, the device has not been distributed to storage facilities in this country. Funds have not been appropriated for protecting children under 3 years of age. In addition, this type of protection is not mentioned in long-term plans for civil defense.

"When Mona Rokke was a member of parliament, she said that the personal protection of Norwegians from gas was irresponsibly poor. But the situation did not improve after she became justice minister and, thus, responsible for civil preparedness," editor Rolf Thue of the Directorate for Civil Preparedness said in a recent interview with AFTENPOSTEN. Mona Rokke stated that, of the 380,000 gas masks we have in this country, 150,000 are in satisfactory condition. Work is underway to improve the remaining masks, primarily by replacing the filter cartridges.

However that might be, few masks and filters have been ordered from Helly-Hansen during the past 2 or 3 years. "The Swedes have 4.5 million gas masks and it would certainly not be unreasonable for us to have 1.5 million masks here in Norway," marketing chief Frimann said. "For about 15 million kroner

per year, we could deliver 100,000 filter cartridges, 5,000 child protection devices, and 15,000 gas masks. Still, it would take many years before our needs were met. Earlier we delivered some masks abroad, but these countries are now self-sufficient. Now they, themselves, are interested in maintaining production and jobs."

If production is shut down at Helly-Hansen and Norway is forced to purchase gas masks abroad, it will be much more expensive, according to marketing chief Frimann.

AFTENPOSTEN visited the division in Moss where the production of filters is now underway. In principle, the military and civilian masks are alike. Both are designed as protection against several types of war gas. Only the colors distinguish them. The filters, which are screwed into the air intake, are packed in bags of plastic and aluminum and may be stored for almost 20 years. An ingenious device monitors the flow and purity of the air. The filters are tested for various types of gas in a laboratory. The masks are delivered with or without shoulder bags.

Helly-Hansen also produces masks for industry and agriculture, although only in marginal quantities. These also offer protection against other types of gas, such as ammonia in fertilizer storage rooms. They may also be used for protection during spraying or industrial gas leaks. The filters vary according to the need.

Will production continue at Helly-Hansen or must production cease because of too few orders? Helly-Hansen described the situation in a letter to the Directorate.

"Unfortunately, I can say nothing about possible subsidies until the entire budget is balanced," Rolv Hartmark of the Directorate for Civil Defense said. But Helly-Hansen wants a response to its letter within 1 week, if not sooner. "It would be most unfortunate if production were to cease," he added.

In an emergency situation, it would be difficult to restart production of this type.

9336

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MILITARY

NORWAY

SWEDEN VIEWED AS ONLY WEAK MILITARY BUFFER FOR COUNTRY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Dec 84 p 9

[Commentary by John Ausland]

[Text] In 1970 Olof Palme delivered a speech in Washington in which he bragged about Sweden's military budget. He pointed out that, on a per-capita basis, Sweden had the fourth largest military budget in the world. Only the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel spent more. If Palme were to deliver a similar speech today, he could not make the same claim. The fact is that Sweden has now dropped a long way down the list.

During a recent visit to Stockholm, I asked Prime Minister Palme to comment on this fact. He said it was a result of the devaluation of the Swedish krona. Even if there is something to this, the truth is that Sweden uses a smaller share of its prosperity on defense now than in the past. If we use the national product as a yardstick, we see that defense expenditures have dropped from 5 percent during the 1950's to just over 3 percent.

Since Norway and Sweden spend about the same amount of their budgets on defense, it is not surprising that Norway and Sweden are facing many of the same problems when it comes to modernizing their forces. I learned that, when the Swedish Defense Commission made an unpublicized visit to Norway in November, the commission was surprised to see how similar the problems of the two countries were.

There is one primary difference, however. The Swedes were much slower to realize that, in recent decades, there has been an increase in the military capacity of the Warsaw Pact that may be used against their country. Despite the danger signals, the Swedish authorities allowed the public to fall asleep. As we know, the Swedes had a rude awakening in 1981 when an unfortunate Soviet captain ran his submarine aground near Karlskrona.

The question now is: Are the Swedes really awake today?

Sweden's Evaluation Of The Threat

As an alliance-free state that hopes to remain neutral in a possible future European conflict, Sweden has an official doctrine according to which the

country must be prepared to defend its neutrality against all comers. Brochures published by the Swedish authorities contain maps showing how Swedish forces defend all their boundaries.

When I asked the chief of staff, Adm Bror Stefenson, about that, he stressed that Swedish forces would conduct major maneuvers next year that will include exercises based on the assumption that Sweden was being attacked on its western boundary.

Nevertheless, I learned during my discussions in Stockholm that, as soon as the formal statements on neutrality were made, official spokesmen and defense analysts concentrated on their concern over the Warsaw Pact.

There are many possible situations. One is the possibility of a Soviet attack through northern Sweden directly against air bases in North Norway. (In this connection, some Swedes perceive the possibility of a limited NATO attack through northern Sweden in order to beat the Soviets to the punch.) According to another scenario, the Warsaw Pact, after taking Denmark, could cross southern Sweden, move northward, and attack the Oslo region. There now is a growing fear of some amphibious action by the Warsaw Pact against the eastern coast of Sweden.

Although the Swedish air defense system seems prepared to counter any intrusion in the country's air space, whether by NATO or by the Warsaw Pact, the placement of radar stations indicates that the greatest concern is related to a possible attack by the Warsaw Pact.

With regard to the navy, what is left of it after the defense resolutions of the early 1970's, it is directed primarily against the threat from the Warsaw Pact. The primary task of the navy today is to deal with Soviet violations of Swedish coastal waters in times of peace.

The Swedish Defense Concept

The Swedish military concept of dealing with these threats is simple. The Swedish air force will try to counter any intrusion into Swedish air space and any air attack against Sweden. The air force and the navy will try to turn back any attempt to make amphibious landings anywhere along the coast. The army's task is to turn back any intrusion on Swedish land, whether this involves amphibious operations or boundary crossings. Priority has been given to the southern section of the country where most of the people live and where industry is located, although special attention also is devoted to northern Sweden.

Where Money Goes

In recent years Sweden, like Norway, has given priority to the air force. With an estimated 400 combat aircraft and over 100 bases spread across the country, the Swedish air force is one to be reckoned with, but until it receives an airborne early-warning system sometime during the 1990's, radar will continue to be its weakest link.

The Swedish army has received some new equipment although, once again like Norway, there is not enough money to modernize all brigades. Most of the attention has been centered around mobility on the ground and antitank weapons. Air defenses are far from sufficient and a move toward the use of helicopters began only recently. If the army faced Soviet forces with attack and personnel helicopters, the Swedish units would have serious problems.

My understanding is that there is little serious interest, neither in the government nor in the opposition, in adding considerably to the defense budget. In other words, the Swedes are only half-awake today. They are seriously concerned over what the Soviets are doing, but they are not yet willing to put this concern into action.

9336

CSO: 3639/56

MILITARY

SPAIN

NEW MILITARY LAW SEEN PREJUDICIAL TO NAVY

Madrid YA in Spanish 2 Jan 85 p 9

[Text] The reduction in the time that future members of the military will spend in the ranks will not bring benefits to all the sectors concerned, as is thought, because several studies conducted by the Navy show that the new military service law will represent considerable harm for them. This law, which will start being applied this year, now stipulates a percentage of regionalization; it will centralize the work in the Defense Ministry and it moves the incorporation into the ranks forward a year.

The plans for modernizing the three branches of the military which Narcis Serra approved during his 2-year stay in the Defense Ministry will start bringing their results during 1985. Unquestionably, the law that will cause the greatest results insofar as the people are concerned will be the one on military service. The 237,246 youths who will start their "mili" this year will be the first to whom this law will be applied, one guided by two principles: a reduction in the contingent, and regionalization of the largest percentage possible of the youths. What has been kept quiet during the time that the study of the law has lasted is the pressure brought to bear by the Navy to prevent the new military service model from hurting it. In the end, it did not attain the desired results.

The Navy's complaints, carefully guarded even by the seamen themselves, are based on the fact that, with the reduction in the "mili" period, the troops will show worse results in a job as specialized as that performed in the Navy; and, at the same time, the wear on military equipment will increase considerably. For this reason, the Navy attempted to prevent the reduction in the time spent in the ranks by the troops, at least the volunteers; but the Defense Ministry refused to make exceptions.

To avoid further detriment to this branch, a temporary situation has been stipulated to change from the current 18 months that the Navy has to the 12 called for in the law. Therefore, this year the replacements will remain 13 months in the Army and Air Force, and 15 in the Navy. Next year, the 12-month stay for the three branches will be enacted. Starting in 1985, the volunteer service will last 16 months.

In view of the great complexity of this reform, which attempts to bring our Armed Forces closer to the European models, the Defense Ministry must still approve the regulations that will detail the concrete steps to be followed for the fulfillment of military service. It is possible that the approval of these regulations will be delayed a few months, because this is a ruling with the status of a decree, and involves some compulsory procedures, such as that of passing through the Council of State. Despite the lack of these rules, the steps that the recruits who must join the ranks will have to take in order to comply with their obligation and right to enlist are already very clear.

Centralization of Functions

One of the main changes made by the law is the centralization of functions in the Defense Ministry, which is the one that decides, after studying the requests from the three branches, on the quota of troops that will perform their service in each branch. Before the lottery, only one of which is desired per year, and which in the future might be televised in order to facilitate familiarity with it on the part of those concerned, the defense minister will issue an order in which he will decide, among other things, on the number of youths who will be quota surpluses.

The joining of the ranks has been moved up to 19 years, and will take place during 1986, 1987 and 1988, causing the pertinent replacements to have added to them the youths associated with the first 4-month period of the following year. Young men will have to enlist in the municipal councils during the final quarter of the year in which they reach the age of 17; the lottery will be held the next year, and they will join the ranks the following year.

The regionalization so much requested by the regionalist parties will start going into effect this year, with a percentage exceeding 30, counting volunteers; and it is expected that the number will reach 40 percent within a few years.

The problem in this area is that the military territorial demarcations do not coincide with the autonomous regions, because there are six in the former, whereas the autonomous regions total 17. The fact that a youth performs his military service within his own military region does not mean that the unit in which he serves will be in his own province. In this respect, the military thinking is opposed to that of civilians. Whereas the former claim that it is very advantageous for the training of the youths to have them leave their usual environment and for them to be forced to assume responsibilities on their own, the regional parties consider primarily the trauma and the expenditures that this solution entails.

One important point in the law is the expansion of the expedient of appeal. In the past, it was exhausted in the administrative expedient, and now one can have recourse to the administrative dispute and the territorial hearing.

Two Unresolved Problems

When PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] was in the opposition, it defended two reforms with particular concern: conscientious objection and women's inclusion in the Armed Forces. With the new law, there appears the legal category of exemption from military service, which is recognized by the future specific law on conscientious objectors. Those who have recourse to it will perform substitute social service, which will have a duration longer than that for service in the ranks. The constant criticism from the Movement of Conscientious Objectors (MOC) since the government's intentions in this regard were made known have not ceased.

With respect to women's inclusion in the Spanish Armed Forces, the law states that it will be the object of a specific law. Nevertheless, there has been confirmed what we have claimed on several occasions: Minister Serra has no intention of carrying out this integration, although the issue could be brought up again after the forthcoming elections.

2909

CSO: 3548/70

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

RESEARCH, VENTURE CAPITAL RESOURCES SPUR BERLIN ECONOMY

Business Recognizes Research Potential

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 16 Nov 84 p 3

[Excerpts] It was the idea of Prof Dr Rolf Rodenstock, president of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), to invite to a research conference of the German industry in Berlin. Businessmen, politicians and scientists were to discuss "on location" the high standing of Berlin as a research center and to provide additional impetus to scientific-economic cooperation.

Rodenstock and his friends in the Berlin Senat, the universities, scientific institutions and the Berlin Chamber of Commerce have reason to be satisfied: 50 leading companies in the FRG accepted the invitation and most of their experts were impressed.

Federal Minister for Research Dr Heinz Riesenhuber summarized it in a few short words: They found an excellent infrastructure in Berlin's scientific scene and institutions whose fast growth in recent years was impressive and which were now providing the basis in the area of innovations.

The budget policy of the Federal Ministry for Research clearly reflects this "change of Berlin," the minister noted. While, in 1974, DM 86.6 million in promotional funds had been channeled to Berlin, the amount today has soared to DM 250 million. Of that total, project-tied promotion between January and September of this year was more than total funds expended for the entire year 1983.

Prof Dr Wilhelm Kewenig, Berlin senator for economics, gave some important details on the upward trend of innovative research in Berlin: Interregionally, Berlin takes second place behind Munich and is equal to the entire Hannover-Brunswick-Goettingen area--in both statistical and financial terms.

In Berlin, about DM 3 billion a year are spent on science, research and education at universities, at non-university research establishments and in industry (R&D). That is approximately 7 percent of total FRG expenditures on science. To appreciate their importance, these figures must be seen in perspective because only 3 percent of the population lives in Berlin and its share of overall economic output is only 3.5 percent.

In terms of total federal public expenditures on research and science, every tenth deutschmark is being invested in Berlin, and that's not just for scientific policy reasons, but also to further education, research and development--areas that are considered important for ensuring and shaping the future of the city. Kewenig emphasized the particular importance of attracting first-class scientists to Berlin, a task that would become increasingly easier.

Thus, 329 new professors had come to Berlin during the past 3 1/2 years, he noted. Berlin must become neither a sterile "academogorod" nor a scientific "variety store"--all those in responsible jobs understand this. With the arts and natural sciences forming productive cooperative relationships, key areas would be identified that would be of special interest to industry. Only a few areas: transportation technology, manufacturing and material technologies, communications technology, genetic biology, medical laser technology, microelectronics and--with a look towards the future--solid-state laser technology.

At the end of the research conference, it was easy to see that the German companies are obviously prepared to accept this offer. Here, it is not a matter of relocating existing research capabilities in companies, but to remind them of Berlin when they start new activities. As Prof Rodenstock stated: Berlin is suited for being both a pilot and prototype for structural change in the German industry which requires moving from the classical manufacturing methods to hi-tech and value-added production.

Already, a first practical success that took place on the fringes of the convention can be reported: The firms MBB, Aeskulap and Zeiss have agreed to form a joint venture with the Free University of Berlin that is designed to do research on, and disseminate laser medicine. A spokesman for the firm SEL pointed out that Berlin has gained increased importance for his firm in the digital communications technology area. Thus, the company has moved its production of data terminal equipment, including hardware and software, to Berlin. For Prof Rodenstock, it was a big success when he was able to announce a followup conference to be convened in about two years to review the results of the meeting.

Business, Science, Government Linkages

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 2 Nov 84 p 85

[Article by Elmar Pieroth, Berlin senator for economics and transport:
"Berlin's Special Advantage is its Unique Research Potential"]

[Text] To speedily translate research results into new products, to push forward with innovations on a broad front, particularly in the leading technologies while emphasizing quality, that is extremely important to many companies in the FRG if they want to remain internationally competitive. To these firms, Berlin offers special advantages: above all, the FRG-wide unique research potential with more than 37,500 employees in 180 research institutions, many of which are first-class.

To strengthen this locational advantage and to utilize it profitably, and to establish closer linkage between science and industry, that is the strategic basis for the Senat's structural policies to revitalize Berlin's economy. In order to create new competitive jobs in Berlin, the companies must open up new markets by way of innovative and intelligent products. A carefully harmonized package of structural policy measures is providing comprehensive assistance to these efforts.

More Linkage with Research through Innovation Assistants

Meanwhile, innovation assistants are introducing more than 130 small and medium-sized businesses, which in the past have not employed any engineers or business managers, to university knowledge and methods--for one year, with the Senat paying 40 percent of the cost of salaries. They make it easier for, and may even enable, these firms to gain, for the first time, access to research results and to translate them into new products and processes.

One of the key promoters of new technological development is the Berlin Innovation and Founders Center, the first of its kind in the FRG. The geographical proximity of science and industry as well as the opportunity to exchange ideas are helping business to speed up the utilization of research findings for new products. The so-far very positive experiences show /inter alia/ that interesting joint undertakings are being established here. This is not the only reason for expanding the Founders Center into a large-scale industrial and technology parks.

Special measures to start a business and to encourage saving provide an incentive for setting up sound new enterprises. Among them, technology-oriented companies receive special support.

Senat Provided Initial Stimulus for Venture Capital

At Senat initiative, new steps have been taken in the past two years to bring technology development back to Berlin. Joint efforts by producers and users in innovating companies in the area of, e.g., railroad technologies, integrated systems technologies and motor vehicles, energy and environmental technologies, manufacturing technologies and robotics, medical technologies,

etc., accelerate the development and testing of the leading technologies and make it thus possible to bring the product earlier on the market.

A Senat innovation fund which, in less than two years, supported 25 projects with DM 11 million, in an effort to supply young technology enterprises with needed venture capital, provided the initial spark for the creation of a number of private venture-capital companies in the city. Finance companies as well as big firms participated in this undertaking. Since then, after the German insurance industry created a fund, Berlin has developed into a primary venture capital center of supra-regional importance.

Assistance in Starting Own Marketing Efforts

As a center for industries of the future, Berlin must be able to furnish highly qualified technical personnel in the very near future. Over the past 10 years, Berlin has already shown that it was extremely successful when it boosted the number of training slots for traditional jobs by 135 percent. Now it is often a matter of breaking new ground in educating and providing continuing advanced education for future hi-tech professions in both Berlin and the entire FRG.

The Society for New Professions Berlin (GNB), jointly established on 23 October by Nixdorf, Siemens and PSI with Senat assistance, will shortly start training a first group of highschool and university graduates for professions of the future, such as EDP marketing or production organization.

One of the big tasks the economy of Berlin is facing is marketing and distribution. Only those will succeed in penetrating new markets, including the fast growing threshold countries of South East Asia, who are able to identify and meet customer needs as promptly as possible. Only product innovations, combined with special marketing and distribution efforts, will guarantee success. The Berlin Senat is offering assistance to business as an incentive to overcome the somewhat larger obstacles caused by the city's insularity--in order to trigger marketing and distribution impulses that will have long-lasting effects.

These innovation and structural policies are part of the revised sales-tax preference provision of the Berlin Promotion Law. They are a significant inducement for better-quality jobs and entrepreneurial functions as well as higher productivity in Berlin--instead of flat, low-productivity production at "extended workbenches."

Thus, although still in the transition period of the reform, Berlin has already regained some of its importance for distribution, central management and, above all, research and development. And its enormous research potential--in addition to the great cultural attractions of Berlin for those locating there--is being utilized with increasing intensity.

As a result of these structural policies, Berlin corporations are increasingly becoming demand magnets and more interesting partners. Hence, the Senat is

relying more and more on its own strength. But the revitalization process that has been set in motion requires time. Nevertheless, a number of indicators, even in the employment area, are showing a clearly upward trend:

- . Unlike in past years, Berlin's employment in manufacturing grew again between January and June of this year,

- . Among the larger cities north of Frankfurt, Berlin has the lowest unemployment rate,

- . While FRG unemployment was, on the average, higher in August 1984 than in August 1983, it dropped in Berlin by 1.7 percent.

These are not only encouraging signs that the structural and innovation policies are successful. They also demonstrate to the entrepreneur that the inducements to make use of Berlin's advantages offer significant opportunities in Berlin and for Berlin.

Venture Capital Activity High

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 24 Oct 84 p 11

[Article by Peter Martin: "'Silicon Wedding' Lures Many Young Companies"]

[Excerpts] "This is exactly the right place where you find the founders' scene," noted Elmar Pieroth, Berlin senator for economics and transport, at the beginning of a one-day venture capital symposium at the Berlin Innovation and Founders Center (BIG). His statement doesn't seem to be an exaggeration because, in addition to the Senat's innovation fund, nine private venture capital funds have already started operations at the Spree river.

In the beginning, it was just the idea, which the senator described as "merely wanting to provide impulses for private initiative." Banks and young companies responded surprisingly well. The Senat is talking of 209 technological firms which cooperate, in part, with 180 research institutions. Meanwhile, the Berlin Innovation Fund alone has spent DM 12.4 million in promotion funds on 27 projects since it was created in September 1982.

The prerequisites for venture capital are present in Berlin, and especially banks, which are usually scolded for their wariness to enter high-risk ventures, have not held back. All larger institutions in the city have committed themselves to participate in the fund. So have private companies and branches of funds headquartered in the FRG, such as Techno Venture Management and Deutsche Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft (WFG) [German Venture Financing Company]. The brand new Assekuranz venture capital investment company has opened an office in Berlin. Total capital of all funds operating in Berlin is a good DM 300 million. However, only a small portion of that amount has been placed.

Among the funds that talked at the Berlin symposium about their experiences with sensitive venture capital operations, TVM Techno Venture Management reported the fastest growth. In addition to Siemens, the Deutsche Bank, Daimler and other large corporations are fund participants. A Munich firm and its US partner are heavily involved in managing the fund. TVM, which started to operate in October of last year, has already invested DM 30 million and has also invested an equal amount for its stockholders.

Dr Robert Schneider of WGF's Berlin branch--which, with 10 years of experience, is the strongest venture fund for knowhow--confirmed the trend. "At this point, qualifying demand for venture capital is lower than supply." With the adjective "qualifying", he hinted at the lack of management expertise in many young enterprises. "However," Schneider said. "it won't necessarily stay that way."

The banks were the first to be asked to talk about their reasons for participating in venture capital investments. Thus, Jens-Peter Knoblauch, who is responsible for investment policy of the Berliner Bank, stated that, aside from such lofty reasons as strengthening the middle class, very hard profit considerations are playing a role as well. "We expect reasonable profits from our venture investments, not in the short run, but in the medium term, and most certainly in the long run." He also sees in venture capital a good opportunity for banks to observe technological developments, "We have to tackle technology."

This aspect, of course, is of even greater importance for industrial companies that invest in risk ventures. For instance, as Dr Roland Mecklinger, SEL board chairman and contributor to WWV's DM 10 million-20 million credit base, explained, "Large companies aren't even in a position to utilize all of these new developments."

And Dr Wolfgang Aurich, head of BMW's corporate planning, added, "We want to look at new technologies and make prudent investments in growth markets." The Munich auto concern is participating in Berlin's TIG Technologie Invest which plans to invest DM 20 million in dynamic business firms.

While the other funds are cautious about financing venture firms at a very early stage, Helmut Rausch considers this a particularly interesting area. He describes this type of investment, known in the United States--the mother of venture capital--as "seed financing," as follows, "We consider it our job to prepare an undertaking in a way that it becomes acceptable."

At the end of the venture involvement and also at the end of the symposium, there are, and were, the so-called disinvestments. That means the fund is getting out of an investment in order to reinvest the money in new ventures. As in the classical US model, this is done by listing the shares at the stock exchange. For years, this seemed to be impossible to do in the German stock market and there were very few, and frequently also unsuccessful, newcomers to the stock exchange. This has changed in the last two years, and that encourages venture funds to believe that, in a few years, they will be able to handle their disinvestments through the stock market.

ENERGY

GREECE

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS EXPENDITURES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4 Jan 85 p 7

[Text] Supplies of heavy petroleum and petroleum products, valued at 2 billion 209 million dollars, reached 9,999,000 metric tons in 1984.

The supplies of liquid fuels imported in 1984 on the basis of intergovernmental agreements, as the minister of energy and natural resources, Mr. L. Verivakis, announced yesterday, came from the following countries: Iraq, USSR, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, from the company of the Northern Aegean (Prinos) and, on the basis of agreements, from the free market (SPOT).

More precisely, in 1974 [as printed in the text], through intergovernmental agreements our country imported 7,346,000 tons of crude petroleum.

On the basis of agreements with companies, our country purchased, mainly from the Company of the Northern Aegean (Prinos), only 642,000 tons of crude petroleum while it purchased another 547,000 tons of crude petroleum from the international free market. Total supplies of crude petroleum reached 8,535,000 tons in 1984, worth 1 billion 839 million dollars.

Besides which a total of 1,464,000 tons of ready petroleum products worth \$370,000,000 were also purchased.

The total value of crude petroleum and ready [petroleum] products reached 2 billion 209 million dollars.

The following kerosene imports per country were made: Saudi Arabia: 2,109,000 tons; Iraq: 1,235,000 tons; USSR: 1,987,000 tons; Libya: 920,000 tons; Algeria: 689,000 tons; Kuwait: 406,000 tons.

According to unofficial data, our country's total consumption of petroleum products increased by 3 to 4% in 1984.

Liquid fuel supplies for 1985 will be secured again through intergovernmental agreements and from the free market.

Mr. Verivakis declared that the USSR had announced a decrease from \$28.25 to \$28.00 in the price of petroleum supplies for 1985.

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ENERGY

NORWAY

ENERGY OFFICIALS DEBATE ROLE OF COAL, HYDROELECTRIC POWER

Coal-Fired Plants Possibly Necessary

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 28 Nov 84 p 15

[Article by Svein Erik Bakken: "Present-Day Hydroelectric Power Production Is Insufficient; Thermal Power Will Have To Be Used"]

[Text] "In some places, the building of coal-operated plants or other types of thermal power plants may be made necessary if local power plants do not manage to get sufficient hydroelectric power capacity developed or buy enough power," Jon Tveit, an official of the NVE [Norwegian Watercourse and Electricity System] has told ARBEIDERBLADET. But Tveit does not expect power from thermal power plants to take the place of hydroelectric power in this century. When Tveit and the NVE talk about thermal power plants they are excluding nuclear power plants. It will not be possible politically to develop nuclear power plants in this country before the turn of the century.

Hydroelectric Power Is the Cheapest

"We expect that hydroelectric power will still continue to provide the cheapest power in the years to come. Even if we use the present-day so-called estimated interest rate of 7 percent, it will be cheaper to expand our hydroelectric power capacity than to build coal-operated thermal power plants, for example. And if we drop the estimated interest rate down to 5 percent, hydroelectric power will be still more advantageous economically. But that naturally also depends upon the price of coal, other fuels and other fluctuating factors," Tveit said.

Local Power Crises

"The project that will come the closest to being profitable is the one for a coal-operated thermal power plant at Slemmestad being planned by Norsem. But here the planning is concerned, first of all, with the building of a thermal power plant based on heating with refuse," he said.

Tveit also mentioned that Administrative Director Leonard Solvi of the Sor-Trondelag Power Co has said that they may be forced to invest in

coal-operated power plants. "And Sor-Trondelag is not alone in seeing the situation in that way. Both the East Norway area and others can get into the same situation if they do not manage to get sufficient new hydroelectric power capacity built or get reliable power purchased abroad," Tveit said.

Pressure

Now it is not just local power companies that are pressing ahead because they do not think there will be enough power or because new power arrives too late. The industry has felt uneasy recently. They are afraid of having to introduce rationing and of an unsatisfied demand for 8 or 9 billion kilowatt hours in 1990.

The most recent figures from the NVE indicate that the unsatisfied demand will be less than that. In addition to conventional plants and installations being built, we will produce 5.5 billion kilowatt hours in 1990 and 20.5 billion kilowatt hours in the year 2000, the NVE believes.

The NVE believes that it will be able to accomplish all that by expanding hydroelectric power capacity. In cases where it is just as cheap or cheaper to economize on energy in the production of electric power, the NVE now favors equating that with developing new power-producing capacity.

Therefore, what compels the building of thermal power plants, above all, is local demand and failure to manage to produce new hydroelectric power quickly enough. In the NVE, they calculate that all of our hydroelectric power resources, taken as a whole, will be able to supply approximately twice as much new power as is required before the turn of the century.

Minister Foresees Increased Consumption

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Nov 84 p 6

[Article by Morten Malmo: "New Energy Report Ready in 1985--Enough Power Must Be Produced"]

[Excerpt] Even if the government wants to make a greater effort to economize on energy now, it would be unrealistic to anticipate that saving on energy, alone, will result in the achievement of adequate coverage of the demand for power.

Minister of Oil and Energy Kare Kristiansen pointed that out in the Storting yesterday. "We will be taking upon ourselves a responsibility with implications related to social ethics if we adopt such a position that unemployed people do not get jobs because we have failed to provide the business community with enough energy to take advantage of improvements in business conditions," the cabinet minister said.

Mr. Kristiansen also stated in the Storting yesterday that a new and complete prognosis of energy requirements and new plans for satisfying the demand for energy through the year 2000 will be submitted to the

Storting in the new energy report to come out early next year. Mr Kristiansen reminded the legislators that the three parties in the governing coalition have scheduled a stabilization of energy consumption in the 1990s and said that the energy report will give indications of how realistic such a goal is.

Although the coalition parties guaranteed a majority for a 5-percent increase in the government's price for electric power during yesterday's consideration of the Oil and Energy Ministry's budget, the Labor Party could not accept that. "There is nothing that calls for such a price increase. Besides, electricity should be something resulting from the natural physical conformation of our country that gives Norwegian industry an advantage in competition with other countries," Kjell Opseth (Labor Party) stated emphatically.

Cheap Power?

The parliamentary leader of the liberal Party, Hans Hammond Rossbach, pointed out that the recently submitted Storting report on economizing on energy states that efforts to economize on energy can be profitable by comparison with the development of new hydroelectric power capacity. Therefore, on behalf of the Liberal Party, he advocated lower appropriations for hydroelectric power development than the majority called for and recommended that those funds should be used, instead, in efforts to economize on energy in private and public production work, for alternative sources of energy and as funds for helping industries that require power to convert.

Exploration in the North

Next year, millions of kroner will also be set aside for seismic surveying off the coast of northern Norway. Arnjot Norwich of the Conservative Party said that access to seismic data must not constitute a bottleneck in the further development of oil production in the north. Norwich went so far as to describe the results from Tromsoflaket and Haltenbanken as inspiring, and he said that the discoveries that have been made strengthen the belief that the oil operations in the north will turn out to amount to more than mere hope and anticipation.

Norwich indicated that the switch to year-round exploratory drilling at Tromsoflaket at the beginning of 1985 will impart greater stability to the operations and provide better chances for deliveries by the business community in northern Norway. He also reminded the members of the Storting that workshops in that part of the country had performed successful repair and maintenance work on drill rigs.

Enough Safety?

The Labor Party's Per A. Utsi reminded the Storting members that the oldest installations on the Norwegian continental shelf are now reaching the age when damage from corrosion and wear and tear seriously will begin to show. For that reason, Utsi thought it was strange that the Oil Directorate's Safety Division was the only section of the directorate

that is not getting new job slots, according to the coalition parties' draft budget. The Safety Division of the Oil Directorate comes under the Ministry of Labor and Local Government, and Utsi said that he assumes that that department will follow up with new job slots as the work expands.

Do Not Play Around with Numbers

In 1983, the combined production of oil and gas in this country amounted to approximately 55 million tons. The Christian People's Party's Svein Alsaker said that there had been various ideas about what amounts to a moderate rate of speed in the production of oil and gas--that is, whether it means 50, 70 or 90 million tons per year.

"It is advisable not to play around with numbers in that way, but instead to see the idea of a "moderate rate of speed" in relation to the effects oil-producing activities have on the rest of society," Alsaker said. He thought that an even level of investment in oil-producing activities was required, and particularly with respect to the shipyard industry.

Oil Profits for Hydroelectric Projects

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Dec 84 p 7

[Op Ed Article by Energy Consultant Aage J. Alertsen, Norconsult, Baerum: "Use of Our Natural Resources"]

[Text] With the dramatics regarding oil prices in recent times as the background and with a plan for waterways improvement that has been put together recently on our desk, this may be a good time for some reflections regarding our energy policy.

Norway's position as an energy producer has become important little by little. The discovery of our oil and gas reserves on the continental shelf, in particular, has brought us into the front rank of energy producers. In the course of a couple of decades, our production of energy in the form of petroleum has become approximately seven times as large as our production of hydroelectric power. Can it still be necessary to undertake to produce more hydroelectric power in Norway? Should we perhaps save most of our remaining waterways for our descendants, instead?

Naturally it is relevant to ask these questions, but let us look at these two energy resources more closely, and especially over the somewhat longer term.

Norway's hydroelectric power production has now been expanded to approximately 100 TWhr (billions of kilowatt hours) in the course of a couple of generations, for the most part. And there is still quite a lot that can be developed (see figure). Calculated in energy equivalents in the form of oil or gas, the amount of hydroelectric power produced will soon correspond to 10 million tons of oil equivalents or approximately 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.

Our proven petroleum reserves now amount to approximately 4,000 million tons of oil equivalents, with natural gas predominating. In the light of the results obtained during the last production season in northern Norway, skepticism is perhaps no longer as great in regard to the possibility of finding as large an amount of petroleum in Northern Norway as we have expected up to now to find in the south--namely, approximately 5,000 million tons of oil equivalents. Taken altogether, we then arrive at the impressive figure of 10,000 million tons of oil equivalents, which, accordingly, corresponds to 1 thousand Norwegian hydroelectric power years, or our hydroelectric power production for 1,000 years, calculated by equating 10 million tons of oil equivalents with 1 year's hydroelectric power production.


Some optimists hope that Norway's petroleum resources will turn out to be even greater. One can see from the figures that 15 billion tons of oil equivalents correspond to 1,000 years of hydroelectric power production of a magnitude that it presumably will be economically justifiable to use as a standard of annual hydroelectric power production in Norway.

That certainly sounds like a whole lot--and particularly if we calculate using an average annual production of 100 million tons of oil equivalents, when our petroleum reserves will perhaps be enough to last 100 years. In actuality, that is quite a long time when one compares it with the situation in many other countries and the world as a whole.

On the other hand, we will always have hydroelectric power. And--as was mentioned--a Norwegian hydroelectric power production year will soon correspond to about 10 million tons of oil equivalent. However, if one wants to go the other way and produce electric power by means of oil, gas or some other fossil resource, one will produce approximately 25 million tons of oil equivalent to produce one 116 TWhr Norwegian hydroelectric power production year. That corresponds to an efficiency rate of 40 percent. Thus, all the petroleum reserves we hope to discover south of 62° N will then be enough to produce electric power corresponding to only 200 Norwegian hydroelectric power production years, while the gross energy content of those reserves corresponds to 500 Norwegian hydroelectric power production years.

A significant part of the world's oil and gas reserves is used just to produce electric power for civilian and industrial purposes. Thus, hydroelectric power and fossil energy resources can replace each other to a considerable extent. Since it is true that the fossil resources such as oil, gas and coal are only found in limited quantities, it seems to be the right thing to do to develop and make use of the energy resource that lasts forever--that is, water power--to the extent possible. In that way, the petroleum resources, which will gradually become very expensive and are in short supply, can be made to last a longer time. Every year that goes by without efforts being made to develop water power or other kinds of electric power that can replace oil and gas, those limited supplies of fossil resources are used in spite of the fact that it perhaps would not have been necessary to use them--at least to such a great extent.

(1) **NORSK VANNKRAFT I 1000 ÅR
REGNET I OLJE OG GASS**



- (5) **1 tonn olje-ekvivalenter OE = 10 Gcal**
 (6) **10 millioner tonn OE = 116,3 TWh varme**
 (7) **10 millioner tonn OE = 1 vannkraft år (1990?)**

NOV. 84

- Key:
1. Norwegian hydroelectric power produced in 1,000 years, calculated in oil and gas equivalents.
 2. Millions of tons of oil equivalent per year multiplied by 1,000.
 3. 174 TWhr per year.
 4. Possibly usable hydroelectric power.
 5. 1 ton of oil equivalent (OE) = 10 Gcal.
 6. 10 million tons of oil equivalent (OE) = 116.3 TWhr of heat.
 7. 10 million tons of oil equivalent (OE) = 1 hydroelectric power year (1990?).

While most of the hydroelectric power potential in the industrialized part of the world has been developed, only a very small percentage of that potential has been developed in the developing countries. To give a practical example of what is being said here: looking at the worldwide problem, 100 million tons of oil or 100 billion cubic meters of natural gas can be saved every year if that quantity of energy can be replaced by 400 TWhr of hydroelectric power, or other forms of renewable energy corresponding to four times Norway's annual production of hydroelectric power. A very sensible way of making use of the money we make from oil, therefore, would be to invest part of it, at a fairly good financial yield, in projects having to do with the development of hydroelectric power, and possibly other forms of renewable energy--both abroad and at home--and preferably with involvement of Norwegian industry in those projects.

Power Plant Funds Approved

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Nov 84 p 6

[Text] The Oil and Energy Ministry's budget for next year will be for some 14,750 million kroner. Nearly 11.3 million kroner will cover Statoil's loan needs in 1985.

State Power Plants will get almost 2.6 billion kroner for various development projects, among other things. The biggest disbursements here will go to Ulla-Forre plants and to the Kobbelv power plant. One hundred eighty-seven million kroner are earmarked for efforts to economize on energy, while 86.7 million kroner are to be used for seismic surveying in exploration for more oil and gas. The Oil Directorate will be allotted 220 million kroner, while nearly 140 million kroner will be appropriated through the Oil and Energy Ministry's budget for various types of research.

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